

# DEFENSE

Of Certain

## QUERIES

Relating to the

*Doctrine of the Trinity.*

BEING A

## REPLY

TO TWO

## LETTERS

In ANSWER to those

## QUERIES.

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By a LAYMAN.

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*Striving together for the faith of the gospel; and in nothing terrified by your adversaries, which is to them an evident token of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God. Phil. i. 27, 28.*

*Quid tam temerarium, tamq; indignum sapientis gravitate atq; constantia, quàm aut falsum sentire, aut quod non satis exploratè perceptum sit & cognitum, sine ullâ dubitatione defendere? velut in hac questione plerique— Cic. de nat. deor. lib i.*

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T H E

# P R E F A C E.

**I***T being agreed amongst protestants, that the scriptures are a compleat rule of faith, and that every man has a right to judge for himself in religious matters, one may justly wonder that any of that denomination should so far contradict their profession, as to make their consequences and deductions necessary articles of faith for others, and, not content with scriptural confessions, should proceed even to anathematize and hereticate all that cannot see with their eyes, or pronounce their Shiboleth. But how surprising soever this conduct appears, it is notorious that many who are proud of being called by that name, can hardly be prevailed on to acknowledge those as christian brethren, who are so unhappy as not to possess such a degree of penetration as themselves, and have not the art of fetching things out of the bible which they cannot find in it.*

*But that this way of treating others is altogether unjustifiable, will appear very evidently, if we consider, that if one man has a right to*

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*determine*

*determine what another must necessarily believe in order to Salvation, then every man must have equally the same right; but if every man has such a right, then all men are obliged at the same time to assent to both parts of a contradiction, which is absurd and impossible.*

*I shall therefore at present take it for granted, that every man has a right to judge of the meaning of scripture for himself, and to draw such consequences as to him shall appear evident; but then this very right supposes that he is not to obtrude his opinions on others, because that is to deny that he himself has any such right, by denying the universality of it, on which alone his own is founded. But supposing this were not the case, yet then, I say, no man is obliged to assent to consequences drawn by others, unless he sees that they are true consequences; because that is to require him to acknowledge that to be true, of the truth of which he has no manner of assurance, since all men are fallible. If indeed he himself perceives that they are true, he is certainly obliged to assent to them; but then this obligation doth not arise from any authority that another has to command his assent, but from the intrinsic evidence of the things themselves which forces it.*

*Wherever therefore there is an obligation to assent, that obligation is always supposed to be founded on, and proportioned to the objective light in which the proposition appears to the mind of the person obliged: From whence it unavoidably follows, that no man is obliged to believe*

believe any proposition as a just consequence from scripture, unless he can discern its connection with, and relation to, those scriptures from whence it is pretended to be drawn. For tho the consequence should be a true consequence, yet till he himself is convinc'd that it is so, he is by no means obliged to believe it; because all such obligation being founded on evidence, where there is no such evidence there can be no such obligation. It will be to no purpose to object the authority of truth against what is here advanced; for tho truth is of such a sacred nature that it ought not to be resisted, yet it can never be proved that all men are obliged to see it, unless it can be also proved that the capacities, circumstances, and opportunities of all men are equal: but as I am very sure that can never be done, I think I may fairly conclude, that if there be but a willing mind, a righteous and merciful God will accept it according to what a man hath, and not according to what he hath not.

But notwithstanding all that has been said on this head by many learned men, such as the lord bishop of Sarum, Mr. Chillingworth, and others, (whose names will be always dear to the lovers of Christian Religion and English Liberty, and whose Works will live as long as there are any remains of either) there are still some people who have so great an opinion of their own principles, and are so infallibly sure that their conclusions from scripture are true, that they vehemently insist upon the necessity of believing

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them,



*them, and proceed even to exact the hard tribute of an implicit faith from the greatest part of mankind, on no less penalty than that of being delivered over to Satan : but let such men profess as much zeal as they please for the honour of the blessed Jesus, it is plain that all authority that pretends to a dominion over conscience is tyrannical and antichristian, an infringement on his royal prerogative, and, in some sort, rebellion against him.*

*'Tis with such folks as these, and such only, that I have to do in the following sheets ; who tho in words they seem to disclaim all pretences to infallibility, yet by their actions plainly enough shew that the thing it self is too sweet a morsel to be parted with, while they take upon them to lord it over God's heritage, and affix the sanctions of eternal life and death to matters of doubtful disputation : Like Balaam cursing those whom God has not cursed. And surely, when we are professedly taught from the pulpit, that one side or t'other must be damned ; and that if the preacher's exposition is not true, the bible is a downright cheat, and the blessed Jesus an impostor ; it is high time for every man, who has any zeal for the honour of his dear Redeemer, to declare against such spiritual usurpers, who wou'd bring him again under a yoke, which neither he nor his fathers were able to bear. I call them usurpers, and it is plain that they are so ; for while they thus madly stake the truth of christianity on the unerringness of their judgments, and command*

# The PREFACE.

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*all mankind to sacrifice their reason to the idols which they have set up, tho they may be indeed very active in pulling down the pope's authority, it looks as if they were intending to build their own on the ruins of it. I do not say these things with a design to blacken particular persons, but from a disinterested regard to truth, and an unaffected concern for the honour of our Lord Jesus, whose sceptre is, as it were, violently wrested out of his hands, by men who are so unhappily mistaken, as to think even in the very act of rebellion that they are doing him honour, and advancing his glory.*

*I doubt not but the gentlemen I am more immediately concern'd with will deny this charge, since they freely and frequently declare against every thing of this nature; but tho the innocency of their intention may very much alleviate their crime, yet all men ought to be as jealous of this their conduct, and zealous against it, as if they were designing their slavery. But, I know not how it comes about, notwithstanding the charms of liberty, and tho the ties and obligations of duty plead strongly with every man to be rationally satisfied in his own mind of the truth of what he professes, the generality, we see, chuse rather to bury their talents in the earth, than, by an honest improvement of their lord's money, to acquire the character of good and faithful servants!—But let men beware how they allow themselves in such a conduct: for to take up a religion on trust, to make ignorance the mother of their devotion, and venture*  
all



*all their hopes of heaven on the merits of an implicit faith, can be no part of that reasonable service, which alone is acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour.*

*But in order to do our selves justice, and shew that our adversaries are really guilty of invading the throne of Christ, it will be proper to enquire, 1st. What the doctrine is which they make thus necessary? and, 2dly. How far they themselves believe it to be so?*

1. *Let us enquire what the doctrine is. Now since it is pretended that this doctrine is a fundamental article of the christian faith, the most likely place to find it, one would think, should be in the christian institutes: accordingly our adversaries insist on it, that it is there; but, if it be, surely it is very easy for them to point out the passage or passages where it is; and this would at once silence all gainsayers, and leave them for ever without excuse. But so far are they from doing this, that they always express their creeds in forms meerly human, and when we expect plain scripture, give us their comments instead of it. Now tho this alone is a pretty good proof, that the doctrine is not so clearly revealed as they pretend, and that the bible is not so easily prest into their service as they would persuade us, there is no harm in this sort of confessions that I know of; for every man has certainly a right to speak his sense of scripture, in such words as he thinks most proper to convey his Ideas. But when men shall jostle out scripture, to make room*

room for their sense of it, and substitute their own word in the place of God's, it is plain that they think the scriptures an insufficient rule, and that they have a more sure word of prophecy within them, and so are above it. And that this is the case is evident ; for it is not enough to content these gentlemen, that they have the liberty of drawing their own confessions as they please, unless we will humour them so far as to let them draw ours too. Accordingly we find that they are always angry with scriptural forms of confession, as not being a sufficient guard against heresy ; and many of them are for refusing communion with those that will not be more particular. But, surely, if these men believed either the compleatness of the rule, or that their doctrine is clearly revealed in it, they would not act in this manner ; for no arguments can justify so unreasonable a conduct, unless it were possible for a man to believe the bible, and yet not be a christian.

Since therefore this is so plain an intimation, that they themselves are, at least, very suspicious, that their doctrine is not clearly taught in the sacred writings ; let us see whether we can get any better light from those authors who have undertaken the defence of it.

And here, tho they generally agree as to the sounds, by which they express this doctrine, yet when they come to explain the terms (and surely they need explication) there is always such  
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*an unaccountable confusion of tongues amongst them, as renders it absolutely impossible to know what the doctrine is. It would swell this preface too much to quote the many passages which might be produced in proof of what is here asserted; and therefore I shall content my self with just mentioning some of the known phrases by which they express themselves as to the point in debate. Accordingly we find one set of them calling the three persons, modes, postures, properties, relations, powers, and the like; and asserting that to mean any thing more by this term is not consistent with the unity of God; thereby destroying the personalities of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and leaving a Trinity of names only. In opposition to these we have another sort, who earnestly contend, that the three are really distinct persons, consciousnesses, agents, minds, natures, essences, &c. and that to understand the doctrine otherwise is contrary to the analogy of faith, and the œconomy of redemption, which makes a real Trinity necessary. Now what shall a plain unlearned man do in the midst of this uncertainty? How shall he reconcile their different explications? how form his judgment, or fix his assent? Both parties are very positive indeed that something is necessary to be believed, but what? that is the question. One side tells him with great confidence, that their exposition is catholick, and that the doctrine which they teach is the very faith once deliver'd to the saints, and ever since receiv'd in the christian church;*  
and



and to prove that it is so, they very gravely appeal to the fathers, who, as they pretend, always understood it in their sense. The other side, equally positive, and every whit as infallible, say all the same things, and with as great gravity call upon the same fathers to vouch for them, and prove their orthodoxy. In short, these gentlemen are so very different in opinion from one another as to this article, that I know nothing they agree in, but the necessity of believing it. Which leads me to enquire,

2dly. How far they themselves make it necessary? And here I observe, that tho they stily insist on the necessity of the doctrine, yet an assent to the meer sounds is all that they make necessary. This remark perhaps may be thought by some rash and ill grounded: but I believe every body will be forced to allow the truth of it, if they will only please to consider, that tho they all explain themselves so very differently on this head, the generality agree to acknowledge each other as christian brethren. Now the direct consequence of this conduct is, either that contradictions may be true, or the necessity of the doctrine receded from, or else that this observation is just. Neither of the two first can be the case, and therefore the last must. But since I am upon this matter, I shall take the liberty to add, as a farther confirmation of it, what I once heard from a man who valued himself as a great champion in this cause, and who insisted as much on the necessity of the doctrine as any body. It being objected

to him, that a great many people on his side the question had said that the Son is the Father, &c he replied to this effect; Provided they do but believe that the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that there is but one God, it is no matter whether they have more explicit ideas.

And now upon laying together what has been said concerning the doctrine it self and the necessity of it, I appeal to every man, whether or no they are not guilty of the charge exhibited against them in the foregoing part of this preface; for, if the requiring an assent to their opinions and consequences on pain of hell-fire; if the damning men for want of ideas, be not an invasion of the throne of Christ, I believe it will be hard to say what is; and we may even at once absolve his holiness, for I don't see how it is possible for him to go further. And so I leave our adversaries to get off as they can, and to vindicate themselves from the imputation of folly, in discovering so much zeal for they know not what, and decrying the use of reason (as it is notorious they do) in an article which they can never prove without it.

But before I conclude, I can't forbear observing that the writers who have undertaken the defence of the doctrine in debate, generally begin at the wrong end. For, whereas they know very well that some of their adversaries doubt, at least, if not deny the possibility of it as they state it; instead of endeavouring to prove that it is true, they should first shew that it is possible: for while there is any doubt of that kind,



kind, there can be no room for proofs of the other. This is a matter so very obvious, that Dr. Waterland himself, if I mistake not, (for I have not the book by me) in the conclusion of his second defence, proposes to begin with this question, as the most likely way to bring the controversy to a speedy issue. And, indeed, as the main pinch of the question between us and our immediate adversaries lies here, I heartily wish they would proceed in this method, which would save a great deal of trouble on both sides, and go a great way toward giving us satisfaction. For till they can shew, that underived self-existent nature is communicated and derived, which the writer of the letters again and again asserted in a late conference; it will be to no purpose to quote scripture in proof of it, if that could be done, because we can have no greater evidence of the truth of those scriptures, than we have that such propositions are contradictions.

This state of the matter is very well exposed by the late learned, ingenious, and pious Mr. How, (as the great Doctor South has done his notion of distinct natures.) “ But how to understand these [the Athanasian differences of “ unbegotten and begotten] is the difficulty; “ i. e. how the same numerical nature is both “ begotten and not begotten; nor will I determine it: let them do it that can better.”

—— “ But if any would set themselves to “ consider on this matter, I would have them “ take the difficulty they are to consider entirely, and as it is truly in it self, that they “ may not be short in their reckoning. And to

“ that purpose to bethink themselves what is  
 “ the proper character (as Athanasius, and  
 “ before him Justin Martyr phrase it) or  
 “ modus of the Son, (for instance) that ’tis to  
 “ be begotten. This methinks should bear very  
 “ hard upon the mere modalists, who hereupon  
 “ must say that to be begotten is the only thing  
 “ begotten; and so consequently, that to be  
 “ begotten, is the thing that is peculiarly said  
 “ to be incarnate, and that suffered, &c. For  
 “ they must assign that which distinguishes the  
 “ Son from the Father, otherwise they will  
 “ make the Father to be begotten, which is  
 “ somewhat more than to be patripassians, or to  
 “ make him to have suffered.

“ But it must be also upon the matter, even  
 “ the same difficulty, to say, the same nume-  
 “ rical nature, with the modus, is begotten;  
 “ for then the same numerical nature must be  
 “ both unbegotten, and begotten, which is  
 “ very hard: And if they reply, yes, but under  
 “ a distinct modus, well; but what is that dis-  
 “ tinct modus? And when they find it is but  
 “ to be begotten, they must be hugely abashed,  
 “ as one of less deep thought than they would  
 “ think\*.” Thus far Mr. How. Here then  
 I fix; since it is asserted by our opponents that  
 the same numerical nature, essence or being, is  
 both derived and underived, begotten and un-  
 begotten; communicated and not communicated:

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\* View of that part of the late considerations address’d to H. H.  
 about the Trinity, 1695.

let them bring their whole strength hither, and prove if they can that this hypothesis is possible; and I promise them I will immediately give up the cause, without putting them to the trouble of proving that it is true: which even then I believe would be very difficult for them to do. — For if this is not an absurdity of the first magnitude, I will be bold to say that nothing in the world is so.

I shall conclude this preface with a brief account of the following sheets and the occasion of them; which was this:

Something more than five years ago, the gentleman to whom these papers are to be sent, was so kind as to express a great deal of concern and pity for a certain person on the account of his apprehended heterodoxy. The poor honest man (for honest he was always accounted by every body that knew him) returned him thanks for his good wishes; and, with a truly christian spirit, told him he should gladly submit to better instruction, and return to the commonly received doctrine, provided he could answer the objections, and free it from the embarrassment that to him seem'd to clog it. This very reasonable demand was immediately agreed to; and, in consequence of that agreement, the queries defended in the following sheets were soon after offer'd to the gentleman's consideration: who upon receiving them, promised they should be replied to in a little time. But notwithstanding he had given the querist reason to expect a speedy answer, the business was delay'd



*delay'd for near two years, when the poor man (who had done so often before) taking the liberty to remind him of his promise, had a little note sent him, containing only an offer from that person to give a particular answer to his queries, provided he would make a full confession of his faith. This was look'd upon as an odd sort of proposal, because the question was not about his faith, but theirs; and it could not be imagined that he who made this demand was ignorant of the other's principles, since he had taken upon him to condemn them. However, seeing it was insisted on, he did something of this nature in a letter which he himself dictated to his son, of which I can say nothing, having never seen it. After this had been done some time, he began once more to expect the promised answer: for he had no reason to doubt that gentleman was in earnest when he expressed so much pity and concern for him. But, behold, after having waited almost two years longer, he was taken ill of a lingering distemper; and finding it was likely to end in his death, he thought proper, once more, to remind the gentleman of his promise, desiring to get the utmost satisfaction that he could before he left the world. But tho there was time enough to have done it, his sickness continuing for three or four months, I know not how, the answer (tho finish'd it seems at that time) was not sent till he had been dead a pretty while, when it came directed to one of the querist's friends as he had desired.*

Soon

Soon after this person had received the letter and answer, he brought them to me: But without any expectation on his part, I believe (for I am sure there was then no such design on mine) that I should reply to them. I took the letters, and in a little time began to read them, and make some remarks on 'em as I went along, purely for my own satisfaction. I had gone but a little way before I shewed what I had done to two or three friends, (one of which was the person pitch'd on by us, and expected by our opponents for the answerer) who all desired that I would undertake the reply, it being much more proper, they said, to keep the matter amongst Laymen, as the dispute had been occasioned by the challenge of a Layman, than to call in the help of the Clergy. On this consideration I set about it; and some time after was prevailed on to print it, to stop the triumphs of some people, who for several years past had occasionally dared us to the press. And, because I would not do any thing that is unfair, care was taken to acquaint our adversaries that I had resolved to do so, desiring them either to print their letters, or to let me print them; both which they refused: so that if this be a fault, it lies at their door. This is a fair account of every thing material, as far as it has come to my knowledge.

As to the following letters I do not pretend that there is much new in them, it being almost impossible to find out many fresh arguments on so beaten a subject: But if any of the old ones are brought down more to the level of my Lay-brethren;



*brethren; and if what is here said may be a mean of exciting them to exert their liberty, and think for themselves, it is all that I aim at.*

*These papers, perhaps, give the reader a more general view of this controversy, than is usually to be met with in books of this bulk. But whether the arguments are conclusive, or our adversaries letters (which I assure the reader I have every where, to the best of my knowledge, fully and fairly quoted) are sufficiently answered, having appealed to the world, I leave others to judge.*

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A

## L E T T E R

To Mr. ———

Concerning certain QUERIES, relating to the Doctrine of the Trinity.

S I R,



S I profess my self a sincere enquirer after truth, and am always ready to receive it wherever I find it, I cannot but be well pleased that you have, at last, prevailed on a friend to answer *Bendal's* Queries. It is indeed a thousand pities it was not done sooner ; for, who knows but, under God, it might have been a means of converting him from the error of his ways, and saving a soul from death ?— A thing which, to be sure, one of your *charitable* temper must have mightily rejoiced in. But unhappy for him, who has thus miss'd a mean of conviction ; and for you, who may have hereby lost your part of the glory of making a convert ; a friend of yours had the answer, and could not then attend to a matter of so small importance as the salvation of a soul ! I cannot tell what you may think

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of

of this procedure, but I dare say, you will be puzzled to reconcile it with your charitable pity ; which your friend takes care to put us in mind of two or three times in his letter.

But it seems, your friend doth not like this method of *querying*, because “ the most “ perplexing quirks of the *Arians* are pro- “ pos’d in this way.” I am sorry the *Arians* should displease him ; but it is no new thing for a man to dislike an objection that pinches him, or to be angry with an argument, when he cannot answer it. He adds, that queries are “ most apt to deceive and impose upon “ the unstable, and such as are seduc’d from “ the faith by their respect to men :” and yet the answerer proposes abundance of them, as likely to produce such an effect as any I ever saw ; and your friend says, the answer is *pertinent*. By which it appears, that he likes this method well enough when it serves his purpose, and advances his cause. But because your friend censures this way so much, and objects several things against it, I shall consider his objections distinctly, and then shew, That it is the best method a man can take in such a case as the querist’s. His first objection is,

*Object. I.* “ That few, even of those who “ have time and opportunity to read and “ weigh things, can ever have such an in- “ sight into a controversy, especially one so “ sub-

“ sublime and mysterious, as to make any  
 “ tolerable answer to many things, that may  
 “ be plausibly proposed on either side.

To this objection I answer, first, That I don't believe it is true in the present case ; because I cannot but think, that every man who has time and opportunity, supposing his capacity to be no ways extraordinary, may by application and diligence acquire such an insight into any principle his eternal state is concern'd in, as to be able to render a reason of the hope that is in him ; to make some *tolerable answer* to an inconclusive argument, how plausibly soever propos'd. I am the more confident in this, because I know many persons, on both sides of the question, who are living proofs of it : and if your friend does not find many such among his acquaintance, (which is his reflection, not mine) I am apt to think it rather owing to their negligence, and laziness, than to any natural incapacity, or extraordinary difficulty in the things themselves. My reason for this opinion is, That it does not seem agreeable to our ideas of God, to think that he should make the salvation of his creatures depend upon the belief of things so abstruse and difficult as the objection supposes ; and which, after all a man's enquiries, and the best use of his talents and opportunities, he may be so utterly ignorant of, as not to be able so much as *tolerably* to defend.



But, secondly, I add, That this objection seems to favour the cause of *implicit faith*. Your friend will, it may be, start at this charge; but yet I fancy he will not be able to disprove it. For if we compare what he has drop'd in several parts of his letter, concerning the importance of the doctrine in debate, and the necessity of a right faith in these matters, with what he says in the objection, I think it appears pretty plain. For from these premises it unavoidably follows, that a man may be oblig'd to believe some doctrines without sufficient reason; because, till a man can answer such objections as lie against a doctrine, he can never have sufficient reason to believe it: when yet, your friend says, *That there are some doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed, against which such objections may be made, as few, even of those who have time and opportunity for such studies, will ever be able to answer.*

The second objection is, “ Because revealed truths depend entirely upon the testimony of the revealer; and, as far as they depend upon testimony, have no evidence, no proof, but our only rule; nor can we carry our knowledge any further in these things, than the revelation it self.

I readily allow that this proposition is true; but then I observe it is nothing at all to the purpose. For why may not a man be at liberty



berry to object against a doctrine which he cannot see reason to believe, without pretending to be wise above what is written ? For the question is not, If the bible says so, whether it be true ? but whether the bible doth *really* say so, or no ? Were the *Arians* convinced that the bible teacheth any such thing as you contend for, they would very readily believe it upon the mere authority of the revealer ; well knowing that whatever God says is true. They agree with this gentleman, that whenever a thing is revealed, the inconceivableness of the manner of its existence, is no good argument against the reality of it : but then, as they apprehend that your doctrine cannot be prov'd but by the forc'd interpretations, and unnatural deductions of fallible men, they think they ought in reason to make some little difference between their word and God's. The truth is, this objection seems design'd to insinuate, that we allow that your doctrine is reveal'd, and yet reject it because we cannot conceive how it can be ; which (to borrow your friend's phrase) is *false, and wickedly imputed to us, as he knows in his own conscience.*

The third objection which your friend makes to this method, is, " Because he  
 " thinks the writer or inditer of the Que-  
 " ries hath never been at so much pains to in-  
 " struct his disciples in the proofs brought to  
 " support your faith, &c. as to instruct them  
 " in

“ in several objections against that which you  
 “ believe—Which, he goes on, is not fair  
 “ dealing.

It is pretty plain who your friend means by the inditer of the *Queries*; the word *disciples* determines it so that one can hardly mistake it. Well, but this inditer, it seems, is a sad unfair man. And pray why so? why forsooth, because when he is conscientiously disputing against what he believes to be an error, he doth not think himself always oblig'd to recount every sophistical quibble, and lame argument which is commonly made use of to defend it. But to answer this objection more directly: I assure your friend, (let who will be the writer or inditer) that the gentleman he flings at, is another sort of person; and what is here suggested concerning his unfair dealing, is most untrue. This I speak the more boldly, because I know his constant practice has been to discourage every thing of that kind: and it is a maxim with him, that truth needs no such artifices to recommend it.—Nay, more, I have heard him offer many better arguments, even in proof of your principles, than any either in this letter or the answer. To which give me leave to add, that if trial were to be made, it would be found upon comparison, that his disciples understand the orthodox principles better than many of your *masters*: at least, I dare say, that none of them would be guilty of so horrid a blunder, as to say, that you believe *the Father is the*

*Son, or the Son the Father, &c.* which directly overturns the whole of christianity.

It may be, you will here ask, what signifies all this talk, since your friend doth not say absolutely that the inditer *has not taken any pains, &c.* but only that *he has not been at so much?* To this I reply, That it is enough to wipe off the imputation of unfairness, if, as no honest man should, he has never disguis'd any of your arguments, or dissembled the force of them; which I aver I never knew him once guilty of, tho I have convers'd very often with him upon this subject. And this, I suppose, is as much as your friend can plead in this matter; since, I dare say, that neither you nor he will pretend, *That he hath been at so much pains to instruct his disciples in the proofs we bring to support our faith, the answer we make to your objections, the difficulties that clog his own scheme, or in what he himself believes, or would have them believe, concerning the Son and Spirit; as he has been to instruct them in several objections against that which we believe.*

But, after all, if the gentleman intended were really guilty of this charge, I cannot see with what face your friend can object it to him; because he that accuseth another of a crime, ought first of all to look to himself. And surely never were there more direct misrepresentations of a question, more wilful perversions of arguments, and more sophistical  
eva-

evasions to elude the force of objections, in so small a compass, than in his letter. *Wherefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest : for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thy self; for thou that judgest dost the same things.*

But I find one thing more under this head very remarkable, and that is the new *Arian Catechism*, which your friend seems to have been at some pains in drawing up. It must be own'd, the *Arians* are mightily oblig'd to him for this favour ; but, as they are a grateful sort of people, they do not care to die in his debt. I shall therefore present him with a short orthodox catechism, as fair and as much to the purpose as his, which may be of some service to him in ———. It may run thus :

How many Gods are there ? One. What do you believe concerning the one God ? I believe that he is three persons. What do you understand by the word person ? I cannot certainly tell ; because sometimes it signifies a name only, sometimes a mode, sometimes an almighty mind, sometimes an intelligent agent, sometimes somewhat, &c. as best suits the present hypothesis. Do you believe that the same being can be both Father and Son to it self ? Yes, personally it may, but essentially it cannot ; because that implies a contradiction. Do you believe that the same being can be equal to it self ? Yes, in the sense given above. Do you believe that a necessarily



rily existing person could be *begotten* ? Yes. Can a person who is the supreme God, refer all his actions to the glory of another ? Yes. Is it not the same thing to pardon without any satisfaction at all, as to suppose that the same being satisfies it self ? No. Do you believe that *Jesus Christ* is equal to his God and Father ? Yes. But does not Christ say, *my Father is greater than I* ? Yes ; *but he was then young, when he afterwards grew wiser he alter'd his mind*, to use your friend's phrase. Where did you learn these things ? From the heathen philosophers, and popish schoolmen.--- But I am weary of such stuff. And, indeed, I should have scorn'd to descend to any thing so low and mean, had not your friend led me the way ; for I abhor burlesque and banter in matters of such importance. I shall conclude this head with the saying of a good old puritan : *Whenever a man makes tricks at, and ridicules other peoples religion, it is a shrewd sign he has none himself.*

Your friend's fourth objection is, in substance, “ That tho this way of teaching may  
 “ tend to sooth the natural pride of mens  
 “ hearts ; elate the mind with a swelling vanity, and cherish a foolish and sinful curiosity, and pernicious levity in things awful  
 “ and tremendous, and foster irreligious and  
 “ profane babbling in all conversations ; yet  
 “ it can never make them more holy or serious, &c.” And afterwards, he adds, “ That  
 C “ he

“ he can’t but exprefs his fears, that this  
 “ way (whether intended or not, God will  
 “ judge) is as likely to bring people into a  
 “ difregard and contempt of the fcriptures, as  
 “ imperfpicuous, obfcure, &c. in a word, to  
 “ make them deifts, &c. as to bring them over  
 “ to the *new* fcheme, as it is falſly call’d.

In answer to this objection, I might content my ſelf with denying what it ſuppoſes; ſince it is only ſuppoſed, and there neither is, nor can be any thing ſaid to prove it. For why this way of enquiry, rather than any other, ſhould be attended with theſe bad conſequences, is what I cannot conceive. But to humour this gentleman for once, we will allow what he ſays to be true: And what then? will it therefore follow that it is not fit that a man ſhould uſe all proper and likely methods to find out truth, becauſe it is poſſible that ſome of them may be abus’d by ſome perſons? Is the abuſe of a thing a good argument againſt the uſe of it? Doth your friend think it reaſonable, that he ſhould be debar’d of his natural right of judging for himſelf, becauſe a deift carries his liberty too far, and makes free with things he ſhould not? The truth is, this is an old objection, and was often urg’d by the papifts againſt our firſt reformers. Nothing was more common than for them to ſay, (and with a good grace *they* might ſay it) What, will you allow every private man a liberty of *querying* upon your principles, and thinking and judging for himſelf? Don’t you ſee what  
mad

mad work it will make ? what heresies it will introduce ? how it tends to *sooth the natural pride of men's hearts, to elate the mind with a swelling vanity, to cherish a foolish and sinful curiosity, to foster irreligious and profane babblings, and in a word, to make them Deists, &c. ?* Thus, you see, these objections do as much execution for a *Papist* against a *Protestant*, as they can do for either against an *Arian* : and they certainly conclude as strongly against the general right of thinking for our selves, as against this particular method of inquiry.

And now, having, as I think, sufficiently answer'd all your friend's objections under this head, because he seems to be in a good fit, and discovers a great value for the scriptures, I shall take the liberty to put him in mind of something that hath a much more direct tendency to bring them into contempt, than these poor Queries, which have thrown him into such an agony. The thing I mean, is, *the insisting on the necessity of subscribing articles of faith, as express'd by fallible men ; and the rejecting all scriptural forms of confession, as not being a sufficient security against heresy.* This has been boldly asserted, and professedly pleaded for by a great body of men, whom, I dare say, he is proud to call his friends. And certainly, nothing is more likely to bring people to a disregard and contempt of the scriptures, than such a sly way of insinuating their insufficiency. For what is this but say-  
C 2 ing,



ing, *We are wiser in these matters than revelation it self; we can make amendments on the bible, and express God's will better than he himself has done it in his word?*

The fifth reason why your friend doth not like this method, is a very peculiar one; and what will at any time, excuse any man, from answering any arguments, which may be propos'd against his principles. It is this: "Because, tho every one of the Queries were answer'd plainly, solidly, and unanswerably, yet men that by art and subtilty, forc'd and unnatural straining of words, strange and wild interpretations, &c. have pretended to deduce *Arianism* from the bible, would not think all this sufficient, &c.

This is all perfectly trifling; and to shew that it is so, I need only repeat it, with the variation of a word or two, and the absurdity will appear. It may run thus: *It doth not signify for me to dispute with your friend, because he is not a man to be disputed with. If every one of his arguments were answer'd plainly, solidly, and unanswerably, yet even then, such folks as he, who by forc'd and unnatural straining of words, &c. pretend to deduce modern orthodoxy from the bible, would not think all this sufficient.* Thus, allowing me to be equally infallible with your friend, which I suppose I may pretend to without much vanity, you see these words do as well in my mouth as his.

But



But before I leave this head, I would fain ask your friend, how he comes to be so certain, that all those people who think they find *Arianism* in the bible, would not be satisfy'd with an unanswerable answer, or think the most plain and solid confutation of their arguments sufficient? Doth he know that they are all knaves and villains, as this plainly insinuates? If he doth not, let him retract this uncharitable censure; if he doth, let him make it appear to the world.

What your friend says of self-elevation, and contempt of others, is certainly a melancholy truth; and perhaps, some on our side of the question may be very guilty of it. But then, I cannot think such a reproof becomes this gentleman at all; because our Saviour lays it down as a rule, that before a man attempts to pull the mote out of his brother's eye, he should take the beam from his own.

Your friend's last and greatest reason, or objection against this method of enquiry, is, "That it keeps honest, plain men, from a true state of the case."

Now supposing this should be true, I cannot see any great matter in it: it appears to me to be a very needless complaint. For what if these, or any other queries, should happen to mis-state the question; yet, if they really propose difficulties which the querist cannot get over, they will deserve to be consider'd, notwithstanding any such mistake. For either  
the

the mistake in stating of the question is of considerable importance, or it is not. If it is not, a mere trifle can never be a good reason why mens real difficulties in a thing of importance should not be consider'd. If it is, why then the work will be the easier ; the answerer has the querist at his mercy, and may without much trouble set him right.

But the most material part of this objection, is a severe charge on the querist, as craftily and wickedly perverting the question. The inditement is as follows : “ Thus the querist, “ in his way of representing things, would “ make you believe, that we say, that the “ three persons are *one* and *three* in the same “ respect : that when we consider the Deity as “ *one*, we consider it as *three* : that when “ we speak of the Son as mediator, we speak “ of him as supreme, and the like ; which are “ false, and wickedly imputed to us, (as the “ querist knows in his own conscience) ; and “ thus craftily, I had almost said sinfully, proposed to conceal the truth, and make it “ appear ridiculous.

I have carefully look'd over all the Queries, and I do not find any such thing in them ; which makes me apt to think, that this accusation proceeds solely from a mistake. There is indeed a passage in the first, which may seem to give some colour to it, tho I am satisfy'd the querist did not design any thing like it. His words are these, “ Whether by Father, Son, “ and Holy Ghost, we are not to understand “ di-

“ distinct agents ? or else, the same person  
 “ sends and is sent, &c.” I shall easily clear  
 up this matter thus : By distinct agents, he  
 means beings ; because he cannot possibly  
 conceive, that any thing but a distinct being  
 can be a distinct agent ; or, in other words,  
 how any thing but a being can sustain personal  
 properties ; and, *vice versâ*, how any thing  
 that doth sustain personal properties can be  
 less than a being. According to this expli-  
 cation of the terms, the objection is this. If  
 by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, you mean  
 only one being, as I can see no difference  
 between the ideas of being and person, to me  
 it is the same thing as if you said, that the  
 same person sends and is sent, &c. Thus, you  
 see, he does not accuse you with holding any  
 such thing, because he knew that you pretend  
 to understand something else by the word *per-*  
*son* than he does : only, till you let him know  
 what those different ideas are which you affix  
 to this term, he cannot free your scheme from  
 this absurdity ; and therefore is oblig’d to re-  
 ject it. But I need add nothing more here ;  
 for if I can but shew that this method is the  
 best a man can take in such a case as the que-  
 rist’s, all your friend’s reasons against it will be  
 thereby sufficiently answer’d : *for when any*  
*thing is well confirmed, objections come out of*  
*time*, according to your own rule.

In order to set this matter in a clear light,  
 ’tis necessary to have recourse to the facts  
 which

which first gave rise to this way of enquiring : which are as follows.

Some years ago, certain persons, who, like the *noble Bereans*, really believ'd it to be their duty to think for themselves, and to examine the principles they had been bred up in, (and till that time implicitly believ'd) by that divine standard of truth, the holy scriptures ; after a careful perusal of those sacred oracles, and frequent and fervent prayers to almighty God for the guidance and direction of his holy Spirit, thought they saw reason to alter their judgment concerning the doctrine of the Trinity. Upon which, a terrible outcry was rais'd, that the church of Christ was in danger ; the people were taught to look upon them as men forsaken by God ; the pulpits perpetually thunder'd out damnation against them, and hell-fire was hurl'd at them from every quarter. In these unhappy circumstances, it was thought necessary to draw up certain Queries, containing some of their objections against the doctrine they had forsaken, to be offer'd to the consideration of such persons as were most zealous and forward to condemn them : it being very natural to expect, that those who were so confident that they were in the right, were provided with proper answers to all such objections. Accordingly, several things of this kind were done, and for ought I know, the queries which have occasion'd these papers may have been given to others besides you : Tho, I hope, not in the way of



a *vain triumph*, as your friend affirms.—An accusation somewhat extraordinary, and which I believe he would be puzzled to prove, if call'd upon to do it ; unless he is a searcher of thoughts and a judge of hearts. Tho if any body should have been so silly as your friend says, I don't know that I, or any other who never did any such thing, am at all accountable for it ; any more than you are for the wild rants of some mad *Antinomians*, or than this gentleman is for several foolish things, which have been said and done by his friends in this controversy. But to return.

Having given a fair and impartial account of the rise of this way of querying in *Andover*, I now appeal to every man, whether or no this is not the most natural and best method that could be thought of in such a case ? And here I am sure I have the universal practice of all persons, at all times, in all places, upon all such occasions, on my side ; and, which is more to you than all these, Dr. *Waterland* himself, and your friend the answerer too.—I might bring many arguments to prove the duty of thinking and enquiring for our selves, which would further confirm this matter ; but as I am talking to protestants, I hope there is no need of them, and therefore I forbear.

Thus I have gone thro' your friend's objections ; and done all that I propos'd to do. It may be, you will now expect that I should particularly consider his *true* state of the question, as he calls it ; but, as every thing there said will come

in naturally under some head or other of the reply, I shall only make two or three remarks here.

Your friend begins negatively, and tells us what is not the question, in several distinct propositions; which I shall wholly pass by, and go on to his question fairly stated; which is as follows.

“ Whether the same names, titles, attributes,  
 “ works and worship, do not infallibly infer the  
 “ same essence and nature? If they do, seeing  
 “ they are predicated both of the Father and the  
 “ Son, is it not undeniable that they are co-ef-  
 “ fential and consubstantial?

In answer to this, I observe, first, that it is always an ill omen when a man stumbles at the threshold. For this is so far from being a fair state of the question, that it ought rather to be call'd a *petitio principii*; since it is certainly taking for granted what should have been prov'd; because, you know, we deny that the same names, &c. are predicated of the Father and Son, as will be shewn more largely in the defence of the first query. And this alone hamstringing and spoils your friend's conclusion.

But, secondly, supposing the same names, titles, &c. were, as this question pretends, ascrib'd to Father and Son, yet this would not prove your point at all; because this infers as infallibly unity of person, as unity of essence or being; unless being and person are different things, which it lies upon you to shew, if you would have this argument pass muster.

Your

Your friend's other questions being of the same kind with several things in the answer, will be reply'd to elsewhere. Only as the sum of them all is contain'd in this single one, "Whether the Son of God be necessarily existent?" I shall say something briefly in answer to it. And here, to avoid confusion, and that we may not fight in the dark, it will be proper to begin with defining the term.

By *necessary existence*, then, I understand that primary character or conception of God, by which he is what he is immutably, because underivedly and independent of any. This definition will be fully confirm'd by the following propositions.

*Prop. I.* God is a necessarily existing being.

*Prop. II.* Necessary existence always implies absolute perfection. Or thus, Whatever doth exist necessarily is perfect.

*Prop. III.* A necessary being is what he is, independent on any other; because to depend on another being, is to owe something to it, which is an imperfection.

*Prop. IV.* Every being that is independent, is also underived; because to derive from another, is to depend on that other: which is an imperfection by *Prop. III.*

*Prop. V.* Whatever being derives, is therefore dependent, therefore not perfect, therefore not necessarily existent, therefore not God in this sense of necessary existence.

I shall not stay here to apply this particularly, because I believe no body will pretend that this sort of existence can belong to any other, than the God and Father of all, who is above all. It therefore remains now, that we enquire how you understand this term, as ascrib'd to the Son of God.

By this proposition, then, that the Son of God is necessarily existent, it is plain you must mean either, first, something only that is *opposed to precarious existence* ; or else, secondly, that he is necessarily begotten, derived, caused, &c. neither of which senses will do your cause much service. For tho, in the first sense, as only opposed to precarious existence, the Son of God may be necessarily existent with relation to his *stability* and *incorruptibility*, yet notwithstanding this, his generation may be a voluntary thing. But this will not square well at all with your principles, which must therefore suppose him, in the second sense to be necessarily begotten, derived, &c. if that will do better than the other. And here, to pass by several important objections against this doctrine, it will be enough to observe, that if the Son of God were thus necessarily existent, yet he could not upon any account be said to be the same God with his Father ; because his Father is by necessity of nature underived and uncaused, whereas the Son is necessarily derived, &c. which makes the nature and existence of the Son a very different thing from that of the Father. And this finishes my remarks upon the *fair state* of the question.

As



As for the two things with which your friend concludes, as I can see nothing in them, so I think I might be excus'd if I said nothing to them. But because he shall have no reason to complain, I will briefly answer both.

The first is a reprehension designed for the deceased, but by mistake directed to *Leach*. It is this: “ Seeing Mr. *Bunny*’s charitable pitying  
 “ you, put you upon writing him a long paper ;  
 “ the better way would have been to have told  
 “ him the manner and motives of your conversion, and to have gone on in a scriptural course  
 “ of reasoning, &c.

To this I answer, that your friend might have spar’d all this talk, because the queries were design’d only as preliminaries to such a scriptural course of reasoning, as was the motive of the querist’s conversion, and which would have been offer’d to your consideration long ago, had you thought fit to have answer’d them sooner.

The second thing, (too long to transcribe) is, in substance, “ That the new Scheme (falsly so call’d, for it is as old as christianity) “ instead  
 “ of making men better, has made them worse ;  
 “ and that since the revival of *Arianism*, profaneness and immorality have abounded.

If this is true, I am heartily sorry for it. But I do not know that our principles are any ways chargeable with it. If your friend thinks they are, let him prove it ; and that will be a most effectual way of confuting them. But I need add nothing more here, because all that is said in this place, is but the same thing over again, and has  
 been

been already taken notice of, in my answer to the fourth objection.

But it is time now that I take my leave of your friend, for he begins to grow more than ordinarily out of temper.—'Tis true, the first part of his letter was pretty well, but the more he writes, I perceive, the more angry he grows, till at last, towards the conclusion, he even outdoes himself. Now defiance lours on his brow, and wrath flashes from his eyes, and his zeal rises to fury ! Nothing now is thought too bad, no representations too odious, no colours too black, no names too invidious for his adversaries. They are blasphemers, despisers of the blessed Spirit, contemners of the grace of God, irreligious, profane, proud, uncharitable ;---wheedlers, shufflers, equivocators, and, in one word, knaves and villains. I do not say that your friend delivers all this in express words ; but most of it he does, and wherever he doth not, he takes care to speak so plain that no body can well miss his meaning. But what ! doth your friend think that we are to be bullied out of our senses ? Is scolding a proper method of conviction ? and are his best arguments for the faith to be fetch'd from *Billingsgate* ? Certainly every thing of this kind is directly contrary to the genius of the gospel, and the character of the blessed Jesus ; whose laws should be our rule, and whose example we ought all to imitate : who has taught us, not to render evil for evil, and railing for railing ; which is the true reason that I do not make reprisals.

And

And now, I think my self oblig'd to call up-  
 on your friend to speak out, and let the world  
 know who those persons are, that “ bawl out  
 “ for morality above faith, that don't do as  
 “ they would be done by, that talk mightily of  
 “ sincerity, [and yet have been] catch'd wheed-  
 “ ling, shuffling, and equivocating; in a word,  
 “ that have made use of such scandalous methods  
 “ in propagating their schemes, *even in Ando-*  
 “ *ver*, as would put common honesty out of  
 “ countenance, &c.” And here I expect that  
 his proofs should be full and home; ay, and that  
 he should make it out that the crimes charg'd upon  
 us, in the two last paragraphs, are pretty general  
 too: for one or two instances, if such should be  
 found, (tho I do not know of any) will not be  
 sufficient to justify his blackening a whole socie-  
 ty, and throwing scandal at random. If he doth  
 not do this, he must be content to be thought  
 what I don't care to say.

To conclude, I am sorry that one who talks  
 so much of the motions and influences of the  
 Spirit, should write as if he dip'd his pen in  
 gall, and had his hand guided by a fury. Cer-  
 tainly, this wrath of man can never work the  
 righteousness of God. I hope, therefore, that  
 your friend will for the future lay aside “ that  
 “ pride and loftiness, that wrath and bitterness,  
 “ that strife and envying, that self-conceit and  
 “ contempt of others, which is every where vi-  
 “ sible in *his letter*; because, as these things  
 are foolish, so they are also endless: since inju-  
 rious invectives, and abusive calumnies may be,  
 and

and generally are, bandy'd about from one side to the other, till both parties have quite lost sight of the question. And here I would not have you fancy that I desire your friend to forbear this way of writing, as being afraid of the poignancy of his satire : no, so far am I from any such apprehensions, that, on the contrary, I am satisfy'd it would be no difficult matter to worst him at his own weapons, if a man would indulge such a liberty of evil-speaking. The only reason why I caution him against this practice, is, because I would not have him expose himself, nor prejudice his cause ; which, if it be the cause of truth, will certainly suffer by such a method of defending it ; since the world now pretty generally agrees, that *no man is in a passion, but for want of a better argument.*

I pray God, of his infinite mercy, to enlighten our minds by his blessed Spirit, and to guide and lead us into all truth, that so we may at last meet together, and be for ever happy in those glorious mansions above, where nothing entrencheth that defileth ; but all is purity, peace, and love. I am,

*Yours, &c.*

### P O S T S C R I P T.

AFTER I had finish'd this letter, I found, upon a review of your friend's, that, besides several extraordinary strokes in the uncharitable way,



way, which I had purposely omitted, there was one abominable slander which had escap'd me. The passage I mean, is that where he represents his adversaries as *furiously enemies* of christianity. His words are these: "Nor will ten  
 " thousand objections against the manner, excuse us for denying or doubting of the doctrine, which has been infallibly proved, about  
 " fourteen hundred years ago, against men as learned, as acute, as subtil, and as *furiously enemies* of christianity, as any of their successors ever since." Now, tho your friend doth not say here in so many words, that Dr. *Clarke* and Mr. *Whiston*, and such as they, are enemies to christianity; yet, that he designs this character for men of their principles, is a thing too evident to need any proof; since he again and again charges us with holding that very doctrine which was *infallibly* confuted, and exploded and anathematiz'd, about fourteen hundred years ago, as directly opposite to christianity. But this is a reflection so base, and vile, and false, that I should wonder how any man who calls himself a christian, could be guilty of a thing so enormous, did I not know that it is a common practice, with some people, to use their adversaries in such a manner. Instead therefore of staying to disprove this calumny, I shall present you and your friend, (who, as he is your friend, must certainly be a *Calvinist*) with a list of hard names and scurrilous epithets, which the founder of your sect us'd to deal out very plentifully among those who differ'd from him. " With  
 E " what

“ what humanity (says the learned *Grotius*)  
 “ *Calvin* was wont to treat those who could  
 “ not think as he did, is evident from his wri-  
 “ tings. He calls *Castellio*, because he opposed  
 “ his doctrine of predestination, a knave and a  
 “ devil : *Cornbertius*, a rascal and a dog : The  
 “ writer of the duty of a pious man, with re-  
 “ lation to the then differences in religion,  
 “ (which he took to be *Baldwin*, tho it was  
 “ indeed *Cassander*) a brazen-fac’d man, void of  
 “ piety, profane, impudent, an impostor, worse  
 “ than a brute, given to wrangling : and when  
 “ *Baldwin* had replied to his book, he com-  
 “ pliments him with the civil appellations of a  
 “ worthless fellow, an obscene dog, a wicked  
 “ forger, projecting things impious, and conspi-  
 “ ring with villains ; a cynick, a scoffer, perfid-  
 “ ious, a fool, and devoted to the service of  
 “ the devil with a beastly fury.” And then as to  
*Cassander*, he honours him with the titles of  
 “ self conceited, morose, a mask, (*i. e.* a mere  
 “ outside only) “ a serpent, a pest, and a hang-  
 “ man. These things did so trouble the meek  
 “ *Bucer*, (I will relate the truth, tho I know  
 “ some people would not have it spoken) that  
 “ they oblig’d him to write this sharp, but  
 “ most just reproof to him ; *Thou judgest ac-*  
 “ *cording as thou lovest or hatest, and thou*  
 “ *lovest or hatest as thou wilt.* Yea, and on the  
 “ account of his bloody sayings, he gives him  
 “ the name of fratricide. This lust of evil-  
 “ speaking, *Calvin*, in an epistle to *Bucer*,  
 “ gently calls *impatience* ; and says, he had  
 “ strove

“ strove much against it, and gotten some ad-  
 “ vantage over it ; tho he had not as yet en-  
 “ tirely subdu’d this beast. But, if any one  
 “ will be at the pains to read his after wri-  
 “ tings, he will find, that instead of growing  
 “ better he grew worse : so well did he like  
 “ *that which I would not, I do.* And accord-  
 “ ingly, his friend *Beza* confesses, that in fif-  
 “ teen years space, wherein he taught others  
 “ the way of righteousness, he himself could  
 “ not learn sobriety nor liberality, nor vera-  
 “ city, but did still stick in the mire. I do not  
 “ revive these things out of any inclination to  
 “ quarrel with dead men ; but because I observe  
 “ that, for the most part, men are apt to imi-  
 “ tate the manners of their masters. Thus, we  
 “ find the disciples of *Melancthon* and *John*  
 “ *Ardd*, are generally of a peaceable sweet dis-  
 “ position ; and, on the contrary, those of *Cal-*  
 “ *vin* to be sharp and fierce, and such as they  
 “ imagine God to be to the greatest part of  
 “ mankind. So important a thing it is what  
 “ doctor you choose. I would advise those  
 “ who have leisure, to read *Cassander’s* and  
 “ *Baldwin’s* answers to *Calvin*, for their bet-  
 “ ter knowledge of his temper and disposition.”

*Vot. pro pace, ad Art. I.*





A

## SECOND LETTER

To Mr. ———

S I R,

**S**INCE a right faith in the doctrine of the Trinity is a matter of very great importance, I shall examine the Answer to the Queries with the utmost care, seriousness, and impartiality : for, certainly, if one side or t'other must be damned, as hath been boldly asserted by one of your friends, it highly behoves every man to look about him ; and to weigh all the arguments, *pro* and *con*, with the greatest exactness he can, in order to avoid this terrible anathema. And, therefore, as I am not conscious that prejudice or passion have had any hand in making me, what you call, a heretick ; so I hope I shall still preserve the same fairness of temper in all my further enquiries, and be always as ready to return to the truth, upon conviction that it is the truth, as ever I was to depart from it. And here, I believe, no body who knows me can have any reason to doubt of my sincerity, because it is evident, that all  
the

the motives and temptations of worldly interest strongly persuade me to your side of the question ; which is an advantageous prepossession in favour of your friend's arguments. But to put this matter out of doubt, (if the most solemn profession of one who is departed from the faith may be believ'd) and because the writer of the letter insinuates, *that pride alone, very often, keeps us from forsaking our errors, even after we are convinc'd that they are errors,* (a thing which he can never know) I do here protest, as in the presence of the great searcher of hearts, before whom I expect to give an account of what I am now writing, that, as far as I can know the disposition of my own soul, I am not influenc'd by any thing of this kind ; and that as nothing but the mere force of truth, and overbearing evidence of scripture, could ever have prevail'd upon me to renounce principles I had been bred up in, and for a great while firmly believ'd ; so nothing but the same force and evidence keeps me now from returning to them again.

But before we come to the argument, it is necessary to take notice of a complaint, that frequently recurs in your friend's letter, and also in this answer : which is, *That we don't speak out, and let you know what our principles really are, but shuffle and evade, &c. while you fairly tell us yours.*

Now supposing what you say of us to be true, yet, nevertheless, what you say of yourselves is not, and so consequently you are equally

ly guilty. For, notwithstanding your boasted fairness, I do not find any instance of it in either of the letters. If you think I wrong your friends here, I desire you would point out some one place, where they have so much as meddled with our greatest difficulty. I must own, indeed, that sometimes we are told, "That you believe there are three persons in the God-head." But what's this to the purpose? Don't you know that this is a proposition that we can neither affirm nor deny, unless we understood your meaning? Have we not again and again call'd out upon you to explain your terms? Is it possible we should believe your doctrine, till we know what it is? And is not this case exactly parallel to theirs, who were required to subscribe an assent and consent to a book they had never seen? for my part, I assure you, I can see no difference. I would, therefore, advise you not to cast stones at us, unless you are sure you are without fault your selves, and to forbear charging our confessions with reservedness, till you are more open and particular in your own. Which *you* might be very safely, since *you* are intrench'd and secur'd by the sanctions of human laws; whereas, an unguarded inadvertent expression, may expose *us* to vexatious prosecutions, and tedious imprisonments; which is enough to excuse us, if we were somewhat more guilty in this respect than you. I would not be understood here to insinuate, that you or your friend would be so ungenerous as to  
take



take any such advantages : I am willing to hope better things. But if you would not, there are others who, I dare say, would rejoice at such an opportunity of shewing their zeal : *For the disciple is not greater than his master, nor the servant than his lord ; if therefore they have persecuted the master, they will persecute the disciples also.*—*Yea, the time cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth God service : These things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father, nor his Son Jesus Christ.* This warning, together with the experience we have had of some peoples tempers, was enough to make the querist take a little care how he express'd himself, since he did not know whose hands his papers might fall into.

But after all, I cannot but wonder that you should be guilty of so great an inconsistency, as this accusation carries in it. For how could you pronounce sentence on the querist's principles, unless you had known what they were ? or pity him, as being in the high road to hell and damnation, when you could not tell why or wherefore ? In short, either this charge is true, or it is not : if it is not, then it is groundless, foolish, and dishonest ; if it is, justify your conduct in condemning the querist, and free your self from the imputation of acting by a blind uncharitable zeal, proceeding from superstition and ignorance.

And now, since you deliver it as your opinion, grounded, it seems, upon the talk of other



ther people, “ That our master has been more  
 “ careful to instruct us what we are not to be-  
 “ lieve concerning the Trinity, than in any  
 “ any plain, clear, or positive account of what  
 “ we are to believe ; and what and how to ob-  
 “ ject, than to answer.” I shall spend no more  
 time in preface, but come directly to the busi-  
 ness : and before I have done I hope to shew  
 that in this (as well as most other cases) com-  
 mon fame is a very great lyar.

You begin with this proposition, “ That Jesus  
 “ Christ is the son of God, which, you say, is  
 “ the glorious foundation of your faith ; but in  
 “ the mouth of an *Arian*, or a *New-scheme-man*,  
 “ is of uncertain signification.”

I entirely agree with you, that this propo-  
 sition is the glorious foundation of christian faith ;  
 but then I can by no means allow what you in-  
 sinuate of its uncertain signification in our creed.  
 It is true, you may ask us some questions about  
 the Son of God, which perhaps we cannot give  
 a full answer to, because the scriptures are silent  
 in the case, and we do not pretend to know more  
 than is revealed. But what then ? is this any  
 fault of ours ? or is that a crime in us which is  
 a virtue in you ? Sometimes we are told that it  
 is our duty to submit to scripture, and to restrain  
 reason from prying too curiously into things about  
 which revelation is silent ; and yet when we do so,  
 it is objected to us as a crime, and we are accused  
 with quibbling and not speaking out. — It is  
 F likely

likely you will say that I have given this matter a wrong turn ; but I desire you would remember (for you are really in such things very forgetful) that there is some difference between saying so, and proving it. In short, this reflection will fall on the *Bible* it self, unless you can shew that we reject or disbelieve something that the *Bible* says concerning the Son of God. Which I trust you neither have nor can do.

And now I find that I must take my leave of you till we come to the conclusion, because I see one of your friends steps in here and takes up the cudgels. I would therefore be understood, for the future, as speaking to him, unless I give notice to the contrary. He begins with proposing several questions, which you seem to think very difficult ; but, I assure you, for no other reason in the world but because your master has not taught you to answer, as well as object. The questions are as follow.

*Question 1.* “ What do you mean when you say Jesus Christ is the Son of God ? ”

*Answer.* When I say Jesus Christ is the Son of God, I mean that he is the Son of God ; understanding the word as commonly used amongst men, and answering the idea of sonship in its main respect, (*viz.*) derivation.

*Quest. 2.* “ Whether the frequent use of the word *Son*, must not answer its common use amongst men in some main respect, or it was improperly used, being apt to deceive us ? ”

*Ans.* Yes.

*Quest.*

*Quest.* 3. “ Whether sonship amongst men  
 “ doth not necessarily infer and suppose same-  
 “ ness of nature ? if then Christ is said to be the  
 “ Son of God, his own, proper, begotten, only  
 “ begotten Son, is he not proved by these  
 “ terms, to be co-essential, or of the same nature,  
 “ substance, or essence, with the Father ? ”

*Ans.* This question is nothing at all to the purpose, because no families taken from human generation can ever come up to the present case. Besides, it is so far from doing your cause any service, that it really militates against it ; because, if it proves any thing, it proves too much. For thus would I argue against your principle : sonship amongst men necessarily infers and supposes that a son is a distinct being from his father ; from whence, by the terms, it unavoidably follows, that the Son of God is another being distinct from God his father ; and this is keeping close to the idea of sonship in some main respect.

What you say of sameness of nature is of ambiguous signification. For if you mean by it (as your way of expressing and the following question seem to require) that the Father's nature and his Son's are individually the same, it is evident, to any one that can but tell his ten fingers, that this is literally untrue. On the other hand, if by sameness of nature you understand a sameness of kind only, this can never prove that the Son of God is of the same individual substance or essence with his Father, which is what you would conclude from it, any more than it proves



that a son of man is of the same individual substance or essence with his father ; which can never be, because they are certainly, notwithstanding any such relation, distinct Beings.

*Quest.* 4. “ Whether every son of man is not  
“ truly and properly said to be a Man, in as  
“ strict, proper, and high sense of the word *man*,  
“ as his father, notwithstanding *paternal* Au-  
“ thority ?”

*Ans.* Yes : but then it is always to be remember'd that he is another man ; and therefore nothing can be concluded from hence in the present case.

*Quest.* 5. “ Whether Christ is not so the Son  
“ of God as to be God, having the same divine  
“ nature and attributes as are proper to the true  
“ God only, notwithstanding the paternity of  
“ the Father ?

*Ans.* Christ is so the Son of God that he is God, but not the most high God ; because he has not the same divine nature and attributes as are proper to his Father, whom the Scripture emphatically styles the only true God, the most high God, his God and Father, &c. So that one is really a father, the other a son ; the one is underived, the other derived ; the one has a God, the other none ; which, if I know any thing, are certainly not the same attributes. But to push this matter a little farther.

The Son, you say, has the same divine nature and attributes as are proper to the true God  
only,



only, notwithstanding the paternity of the Father. In answer to this, I would ask you what you mean by the terms Father and Son, as both applied to the same being? You will it may be call this quibbling upon the word *being*; but, I assure you, whatever you may think of it, I do not design it so, but in the sincerity of my soul propose it as a real difficulty which I cannot get over. For that the same being is both derived and underived, or, if you had rather, begotten and unbegotten, appears to me a contradiction in terms. Since therefore you pretend that you can conceive this to be possible (for if you cannot conceive it to be possible, I am sure it is impossible for you to believe it) I beg you, for God's sake, to help me out of this difficulty, which, at present, is in my apprehension an invincible objection against your doctrine. But this is not all: I would ask you further, whether paternity, or, in other words, to be the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is not an attribute and character of the only true God? and if it is, which I can hardly think you will deny, whether or no if Christ be the only true God he is not also his own God and Father, unless to be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ belongs to something distinct from, and not, the only true God, which your notion of personality seems to suppose? and lastly, if paternity depends on, and belongs to something distinct from the only true God, I desire you would be so kind as to let us know what is the foundation of this character, and also that you would help us in form-

forming some idea of it, which, for my own part, I am sure without some assistance I shall never be able to do.

*Quest. 6.* “ When you say as to his natures he  
 “ is body and spirit, do you mean by spirit, a  
 “ human, angelical, supra-angelical spirit, or a spi-  
 “ rit essentially God? if a humane spirit or soul,  
 “ had he any other? If he had no other he was  
 “ a mere man, like unto us, having a human  
 “ body and soul, and no more. The apostle  
 “ assures us that it was not an angelical spirit,  
 “ *Heb. ii. 16.* Scripture and reason give no ac-  
 “ count of any spirit above the angels, but God,  
 “ the true God. If this last is what you mean, I  
 “ ask whether he had not a human spirit also? If  
 “ he had no human soul he was certainly not true  
 “ man, having nothing of our nature but flesh.  
 “ If he had not something more, or if he had  
 “ not also the divine nature, he was not, is not  
 “ God; and so was neither God nor man. To  
 “ such things will your principles lead you,  
 “ whether you know it or not, even to believe  
 “ that he is a God without the nature of a God,  
 “ and so must be an inferior one indeed: and a  
 “ man without that which chiefly constitutes  
 “ the man, his soul.”

*Ans.* If it were not too rude and unmannerly, I might come off well enough here by saying, with the writer of the letter, “ That a man of  
 “ no sense may soon ask questions that will  
 “ puzzle and nonplus all the men of sense upon  
 “ the earth.” But, as our cause doth not need  
 such

such poor evasions, we scorn to make use of them. My answer then to these questions is as follows :

When I say that Christ, as to his nature, is body and spirit, I mean that that Being called in Scripture the *Logos* or *Word*, did assume flesh ; which *Logos*, I humbly conceive, is of a supra-angelical nature, tho not the supreme God. You are pleased to say indeed, “ that the Scripture “ gives no account of any supra-angelical Being “ but the true God only ;” which, to borrow a phrase from the letter, is but *begging hard when you can't dig*. For, that the *Logos* is above angels, is what no body doubts, and therefore needs not to be proved : but yet, that he is not the most high God, the only true God, &c. is evident from a vast variety of texts, which expressly distinguish him from the Father, to whom these glorious titles are peculiarly appropriated : which will be shewn more fully by and by.

As to the question, “ Whether Christ had “ any human soul ?” my answer is, That seeing I cannot find that the *Bible* says any thing of a double spirit in Christ, I do not think myself obliged to believe so ; because it seems a contradiction to suppose that two distinct subjects of understanding, will, and active power, can ever, by any means, be so united as to make but one person without the destruction of one or the other. And here, by the way, I would remark, that your scheme is guilty of introducing the greatest uncertainty into all language, by saying sometimes that three persons are but one being ;  
at



at other times that three beings are but one person. *To such things will your principles lead you whether you know it or not.* Tho, after all, if you can shew from scripture that Christ really had a double spirit, I promise you I will readily believe it, notwithstanding the difficulty there may be in conceiving it.

You conclude this question with a vain flourish, thus, “ If Christ had not an human  
“ soul he could not be a man, and if he had  
“ not also the divine nature he was not, is  
“ not, God; and so was neither God, nor  
“ man.”

Now supposing I should grant this to be true, understanding God in the highest sense of the word, I do not see any great inconvenience would follow; because, notwithstanding this, he might be every way qualified to execute the office of a Saviour and Redeemer. Nay, this supposition represents him a fitter person to act as a Mediator, because he is here consider'd as being neither of a party with the offender nor offended: a matter of great importance, which you would do well to weigh. But, not to insist on this, since you contend that if Christ had not a human soul he could not be a man, and if he had not also the divine nature he could not be God, I shall endeavour briefly to set this matter in a clear light.

When therefore you say, that if Christ had not a human soul he was not a man, I suppose you mean only, that if he had not such a soul as we have, he was not such a man as we are.

Now



Now I know no heresy there is in denying that our Lord Christ was such a man as you or I, because it must be acknowledged on all hands, even by those of your principles, that he was not so a man as all the other descendents of *Adam* are ; for all the other descendents of *Adam* have each but one subject of will, understanding, and active power, *i. e.* but one spirit ; whereas your scheme supposes him to have been two such subjects ; which is much more different from the common notion of manhood, and more effectually destroys his humanity, than the supposition of a spirit vastly superior to, and far above the size of a human soul, if I may so speak, informing and vitally united to his body. For that such an embodied spirit would be really and properly a man is evident ; because our idea of man is nothing else but a being of such a shape and form having a power of reasoning. For if nothing could be a man but a body united to a spirit of just such a capacity, unless we knew the precise limits and boundaries of that capacity, we should never be able to distinguish between what is, and what is not a man ; because, on this supposition, the standard of humanity would be something we know not what. But common experience confirms the definition given above. For, as on the one hand, we never scruple to call an idiot a man, or a changeling a man, and they are undoubtedly men, tho' for any thing that appears, their souls may be of the brutal kind ; so on the other, if any mere animal had a power of reasoning, and could discourse

intelligently and philosophically, yet since he wanted the form and shape of a man, we should not call, or account him any thing more than a mere animal. And this sufficiently shews, that the human shape is the principal idea signified by the sound man. Which was the opinion of that wonderful person who is so great an honour to his country, Mr. *Locke*, whom I dare say you will allow to be as good a judge in such a case as any body. See his *Essay*, p. 284. *octavo* edit.

But as great a man as Mr. *Locke* was, I have better authority to support me than his, and that is the *Bible*; which always calls that a man which had the shape and form of a man, without regarding its physical nature at all. Thus the angels that appeared to *Abraham* and *Lot*, are said to be men; and the angel that wrestled with *Jacob* was a man; and so also the angel that sat at the sepulchre is called a man by one, at least, of the evangelists. Many more instances of the like kind may be produced; but these are sufficient in the present case.

And now, from what has been said, I conclude, that any spirit united to a human body, is by such union truly and properly a man; tho' a man of more or less exalted capacity, as the spirit embodied is by nature more or less excellent. And accordingly I do believe Jesus Christ to have been a man, even tho' he had no soul (which yet I do not absolutely deny,) but the divine *Logos* united vitally to his body, and agent and patient in it as our souls are in our bodies. Which *Logos*, I conceive, upon the

the account of such union to a human body, may very justly be called a human soul. Nothing now remains under this question, but to enquire,

Whether, if Christ had not the divine nature, he is, or can be, God in any sense of the word God. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to observe, that the word God is a relative term, and always implies dominion and authority, and hath a reference to servants ; and *deity* [or the notion of godhead] is the government and dominion of that being whom we call God over servants, &c. See Sir *Is. Newton's philos. nat. princip. Amstel. 1714. pag. 482.* where you will find a great deal to this purpose. But I shall have occasion to speak more of this by and by, and therefore I shall only add here, that since godhead is a relative term, our Lord Christ may very truly be said to be God, since he hath a throne, and dominion, and worship ascribed to him in scripture.

*Quest. 7.* “ Whether the saying as to his natures he is body and spirit, is not the same as to say, he is a creature, a mere creature only ?

*Ans.* No : For upon your own scheme you must say that he is body and spirit, and yet you would take it very ill if we should from thence infer, that you believe him to be a *creature, a mere creature only.*

*Quest. 8.* “ Whether he [Christ] could have undertaken and executed the offices you mention, in the way the scriptures say he has



“ done and does, had he not been absolutely  
 “ infinite in all perfections? For not to men-  
 “ tion his satisfaction and merit as a priest,  
 “ which are directly overthrown by *arianism*  
 “ and the *new scheme*; could he have borne  
 “ the weight of the government of the whole  
 “ world, without infinite power? Could he  
 “ have order’d all things without infinite wis-  
 “ dom? Could he see and know all the circum-  
 “ stances, necessities and wants of his people,  
 “ in all places? Could he hear and answer their  
 “ prayers and supplications from all quarters?  
 “ Could he know and accept the praises of his  
 “ church in heaven and earth, without absolute  
 “ omnipresence and omniscience? Can he be the  
 “ judge of angels and men without perfections  
 “ absolutely infinite? Could he be a quickening  
 “ head to all believers, or could all fulness  
 “ dwell in him, if he were not all-sufficient?  
 “ If he is infinitely powerful, wise, &c. is he  
 “ not God supreme?

*Ans<sup>w</sup>.* To all these questions, I answer Yes; because I make no doubt but his God and Father could and did qualify him for the execution of all these offices: so that for any thing here said, he may not be independent of the Father [*i. e.* in the absolute sense] infinitely wise, powerful, &c. and so not the supreme God as his Father most certainly is.

We are now got thro’ your questions which have been all answer’d fairly and distinctly; but I find we do not know what we have lost by the querist’s not speaking out: for then, it seems,

we



we should have had more of the like importance. I am sorry that you should be hinder'd from shewing your skill in catechizing by any fault of the querist's; but yet I must say, that unless they were to have been of more importance than any of those which we have examin'd, I am very well contented that these should suffice; for I think we have had trifling enough already. But I proceed now to the queries which you promise to answer distinctly one by one: Let us therefore now see whether you are as good as your word.

*Query* 1. "Whether by Father, Son and Holy Ghost we are not to understand distinct agents, or else the same person sends and is sent, makes, and at the same time receives the atonement, and is the mediator, and that to whom the mediation is made; than which, a greater difficulty, either to common sense, or the scripture, cannot be conceived; and whether three distinct agents, are not three distinct beings?"

In answer to this query, you say, "That the scriptures assure us that God is one; and that the names, titles, attributes, works and worship due to the one God, are not, cannot be ascribed to any but the *one true God*; and yet the same essential names and titles, the same attributes, works and worship, are in the same scriptures ascribed to three, &c. we therefore are compell'd to believe them to be the *one true God*."

To

To this I reply, that it is very true, that the scriptures assure us that God is one; and also, that the names, titles, attributes, works and worship due to the one God, are not, cannot be ascribed to any but the one true God; but then I absolutely deny that the same essential names and titles, &c. are by the same scriptures ascribed to three. Since therefore your whole argument depends upon the truth of this assertion, I hope you will take care to support it better, before you pretend again to draw any conclusions from it. For in this performance you content your self with affirming that it is so, without ever attempting to prove it, which does not indeed seem to be your way. And here I cannot forbear remarking, that the whole of this paragraph looks as if it had been composed for the pulpit, where too often any thing goes down, and the preacher's *ipse dixit* alone is sufficient to confute a thousand arguments. But, dear sir, I desire you would remember that you are now talking to people that won't take your say-so for proof; but expect that whenever you father any thing on the bible, you should bring a thus saith the Lord for your voucher. This is a very reasonable demand in the present case, because you cannot but know that we deny that the scripture says any such thing. Nay so far from it, that we are persuaded that there is always a very great difference in the titles, attributes, works and worship ascribed to the three. And here, tho it lies on you to prove the affirmative, I shall recite a few passages, wherein it is  
evident

evident that there is such a difference made as we contend for. Which I hope you will take as a favour which you are not always to expect. To begin then :

When we find it said of the Father, that he is the *most high God*, the *only true God*, the *only wise God*, the *only potentate*, *who only hath immortality*, the *only Lord God*, the *one God*, &c. we think that we have very great reason to believe that these high epithets are appropriated to *him* alone. For supposing the word person to signify whatever you please, if all other persons but the Father, are not excluded from having any right to these titles by the term only, why then there is no meaning in words, but any thing may be affirm'd of any thing, and one might even deny that Jesus Christ is the *only begotten son of God*; since we have no greater security that he is the only begotten Son of God, than we have that the person styled the Father is the *only true God*. But this will be best illustrated by the following instances. When it is said, that King *George* is our only rightful and lawful sovereign, don't you and I, and all the world understand, that every other person is by this form of speech deny'd to have any legal right to be our sovereign? So again, if I were to affirm, that Mr. *M——r* is the only author of the letter and answer, would not every body else be hereby excluded from the honour of these performances? In short, if this way of speaking is not exclusive, it will be impossible to find any other that is.

It



It will be in vain for you here to recur to your usual distinction between *being* and *person*, unless you can shew, which as yet you have not done, that they really signify different things. And certainly your calling each person a *distinct intelligent agent*, as you do in the paragraph now under consideration, can never help you out in this case; because an intelligent agent, in the sense of all mankind, who have no turn to serve by saying otherwise, is a *being*. And so consequently two of the three intelligent agents, upon your own supposition, must be excluded from having any right to the titles above-mentioned. Again, on the other hand, if you should think fit to retract this, and say with your old friends the *Sabellians*, that by the three persons are meant only three modes of existence, neither would this do your doctrine any service; because it is evident that something would be then affirmed of the same being in one mode of existence, which in another mode of existence he is deny'd to have any right to. The direct consequence of which is, that God is not *absolutely* wise, nor *absolutely* the only true God, &c. but only *relatively* so; which alone is to me a sufficient confutation of this way of talking. But, least this should be called vain and carnal reasoning, I would desire you to consider further;

That in several of the places above recited, and many more which might be referr'd to, these titles are ascribed to the father in express contradistinction to the son. Thus, to give a few instances,



instances, *John* 17. v. 1—3. *Father*——*this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God; and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.* Now nothing can be more plain, than that in this place, *Jesus Christ*, the person sent, is distinguish'd from the Father the sender, of whom it is affirm'd, that he is the only true God. So again, *Rom.* xvi. v. 27. *To God only-wise be glory, thro' Jesus Christ.* Where it is evident, that the only wise God to whom glory is given, is something different from *Jesus Christ*, thro' whom it is given. In like manner it is said, *1 Cor.* viii. 6. *To us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things.* And to the same purpose, *Ephes.* iv. 4, 5, 6. — *One Spirit——one Lord——one God and Father of all, who is above all.* In both which texts there is as manifest a distinction between the one God the Father, and the one Lord Jesus Christ, as words can make. To these I shall add but one passage more, which is that in *Heb.* i. 8, 9. — *O God——God even thy God hath anointed thee, &c.* Where it is evident to demonstration, that there is not only such a distinction as I am pleading for; but also, that the Son, even in his highest capacity, as God, is so God as to have a God above him. For more texts of the like nature I refer you to *Dr. Clark's Scripture-Doctrine*, Chap. I. Sect. 1, 2, 3. which, tho you may account it otherwise a bad book, is certainly very useful to you as well as us, since it con-

tains the most complete collection of all the passages of scripture relating to this controversy.

And now, having taken notice of some few titles which are most certainly appropriated to the person of the Father, let us turn the tables, and see if we cannot find several things said of the Son, which must be confined in like manner to him alone. And here I am got into a large field; wherefore, as before, I shall only single out three or four instances from the many which might be produced.

Accordingly we find it is said of Jesus Christ, *that he is the Son of the living God*, that he *was begotten*, that he *was sent by the Father*, that *all power is given him*, that *he has a God*, &c. These titles, it is very likely, you will allow must be understood of, and can be apply'd to no other person but the Son alone: but then, you think to come off by flying to your old subterfuge, and quibbling on the words Person, Essence, Being, &c. which will not at all help you in the present case. For the question here is not whether the one God is three persons, but whether the very same names, titles, attributes, works, and worship, are by the scriptures ascribed to all the three, as you assert. In answer to which, I have shewn by the first set of proofs, that the peculiar characterizing titles of the supreme God, are apply'd to one person, the Father only; and by the second, that there are some things said of the Son, which must be confined to him alone, and are not, cannot be affirmed of the only true God. And now I would appeal to any unprejudiced

judiced person, whether you had reason to say that the same names, titles, &c. which are due to none but the true God, are ascribed to three, and whether all the scriptures recited, can with any consistency be understood as spoken of one being only? Let us therefore now proceed.

A little lower you tell us, that the three persons are ——— “Three distinct, intelligent agents, but undivided in substance or being: so that three such distinct intelligent agents, are not three distinct, separate, or separable beings, but one being only.” This, I confess, is a direct answer to a very material part of the query; and if it were but as well proved as it is boldly said, would entirely over-turn our principles and ruin our cause: but as you have not offered any one argument to support it, we do not think our selves oblig’d to take your word, and *quit our faith and religion, much less give up our selves to believe a scheme of inconsistencies contrary to common sense and scripture, and destructive of christianity*: To speak in language which, I dare say, I need not scruple to call your own. But because I do not care to copy after you, I shall endeavour to shew that this is a very great mistake; for I cannot content my self, as is your way, with only saying that it is so.

By an intelligent agent, I mean something that is the subject of understanding, will, and active powers; by distinct agents, distinct subjects; and by three such agents, three such subjects. And thus far I suppose we are agreed.



The question therefore is, whether or no any thing but a being can be such a subject? Which is so very evident and clear, that I should be ashamed to attempt to prove it, if your denial of it did not make it necessary. The argument I would offer is as follows: Every thing that doth exist is a being; but that which is the subject of understanding, will, and active powers, doth exist, because nothing can never be the subject of something; and therefore every subject of understanding, will, and active powers, is a being. Again, if every subject of understanding, will, and active powers, is a being, then to be a being is necessary to every such subject, because it is absolutely impossible that any thing should be, and yet at the same time want that which is essential to its being: but that every subject of understanding, will, and active powers, is a being, has been already proved, and therefore nothing but a being can be such a subject; which is the thing I undertook to shew.

To say then, as you do, that the one God is three distinct agents, is the same thing as to say that three beings are one being; which is absurd, and a contradiction in terms. For either by distinct agents here, you mean that each person is really and properly a distinct subject of will, understanding, and active power, or else that they are only in an improper sense and figuratively so. If the first be your meaning, since it has been proved above that nothing but a being can be such a subject, it unavoidably follows that each of these distinct agents is really and properly a  
distinct



distinct being: which to assert, is to deny the unity of God, and downright *Tritheism*. But this cannot be supposed to be what you intend by these words; which, therefore, I would choose to understand in the other sense, if that would agree any better with your principles. But here I doubt you are equally unhappy; for if by the terms, person and agent, you mean nothing more than that they are improperly and figuratively stiled so, this entirely over-turns the doctrine of a Trinity, and makes the three persons to be but one person only, which is errant *Sabellianism*. But as I know very well that you disclaim, and declare against the principles of *Sabellius*, I do not pretend to fix this sense upon your words, but would rather charitably suppose that you mean nothing by them; or else, which is very near a-kin to it, that your meaning is, *you know not what*. It may be you will call this a *hard saying*, and cry out, *who can bear it?* and indeed, *sir, I hope you will not bear it, but shew the injustice of it, by speaking out, and letting the world know what your sentiments really are in this matter, which hitherto your whole party have kept to themselves as a reserve.* And here, if you do any thing to the purpose, you must prove, that it is possible that there should be a *medium* between a being and no being; *which not all the men upon earth can do, even tho it really were so.*

In short, if you can produce any one instance in any author, sacred or profane, polite or barbarous, out of the present question, where  
the

the words *intelligent agent* are used to signify any thing not a being, I am content to put the whole of this matter upon that issue, and will give up the cause.

Your next paragraph is a very peculiar one, and nothing at all to the purpose. All that I can pick out of it is, that you would fain shift off the opponyency, and put us upon proving the negative; which is contrary to all the rules of disputing, as any one that has but read ever so little of logick knows. You begin very merrily thus: "The way to prove this impossible, is not by quibbling upon the words person, being, God, which is endless and usefess, seeing you and we take them in different senses." Now considering that you call all our arguments of this kind quibbles, this is the same thing as if you had said, that the way to prove this impossible, is not to use any of the arguments that prove it so; for this is endless and usefess. If you think this an invidious way of representing your words, I only desire you to shew that it is so, by proving that all our reasonings from these terms are but mere quibbles, (which as yet you have only affirmed) and I am content that they should bear the odious name; for I assure you whenever that shall be done, a great part of my difficulties will be cleared up, and I shall never more trust to such broken reeds, such rotten supporters of a bad cause, but for ever renounce both it and them. I am therefore, I must confess, entirely of your mind, that quibbling upon the words person, being, God and the like, is endless and usefess;

useless; but then I doubt we shall not agree so well as to the quibblers. And since I find that you make no scruple to cast this reflection several times on us, I shall now recriminate by retorting the same charge on you; and let the impartial world judge who is most guilty: whether we, who always use these terms in the same plain, uniform sense; or you who never use them in any determinate sense at all, but make them stand for names, or modes, or minds, or spirits, or agents, &c. as best serves the present purpose. But, after all, if I may be allow'd to judge of your abilities by your performance, I can't help thinking that the true reason why you do not like our arguments drawn from the ideas of person and being, is only this short one, *that you cannot answer them.*

And now, having tied up our arms as you imagine, like a true coward, you advance very courageously, and throw out your flag of defiance. Your challenge runs thus: "But let your whole party prove if they can, that it is impossible that there should be three such distinctions in the divine nature, as to be a sufficient foundation of ascribing all the characters and actions to the three particularly, which the scripture doth." This is a *coup d' eclat* indeed! Now you are safely intrench'd! and from this enchanted fort, may securely defy not only our party, but all the men upon earth, as you do a little lower; for as nonsense is neither true nor false, so it can neither be proved nor disproved. But to be serious: let this proposition  
be



be supposed to signify what it will, it doth not affect us at all; for it is not our business to prove your doctrine impossible, but yours to make appear that it is true. I shall therefore take no further notice of any thing in this paragraph, since it is all to the same purpose, and has been already sufficiently reply'd to in the foregoing part of my vindication of this query; which must certainly stand good, till some other explication of the word *Person* can be given than the world has hitherto been blessed with. I proceed now to your questions.

*Quest. I.* “ Whether any sober man, who has  
 “ searched the scriptures in the fear of God,  
 “ with that temper of mind which is necessary,  
 “ and diligent fervent prayer to God for assist-  
 “ ance, can say that the same essential names  
 “ and titles, the same attributes, works, and  
 “ worship, which are proper to the one true  
 “ God, and by which only the one true God  
 “ could be revealed to us, are not ascribed to all  
 “ the three? whether they are not then the one  
 “ true God? or, in other words, whether he  
 “ can say that the received doctrine of the Tri-  
 “ nity is not so sufficiently revealed in the bible,  
 “ as that it would be universally believ'd to be  
 “ the scripture-doctrine, were it not for the dif-  
 “ ficulty of apprehending it? The only reason  
 “ of which is its inconceivable nature; and  
 “ because there is not any thing in the creation  
 “ known to us, that clearly represents either this  
 “ union or distinction.”

*Ans.*



*Ans.* This is an extraordinary sort of a question; and the best answer that can be given it is to deny it. I shall therefore content my self with directly unsaying it. And, accordingly, I do affirm, that [I have reason to believe] there are some persons, who have searched the scriptures with all those requisite qualifications you speak of, who can [truly and with a good conscience] say, that the same essential names, &c. by which only the one true God could be revealed, are not [as they can find] in the bible ascribed to three. Nay, so far are they from seeing any thing like it, that on the contrary they are verily persuaded that the receiv'd doctrine has no foundation in the bible; but that something quite different from it is so clearly taught there, that if men were not bias'd by the prejudices of education and the fear of popular reproach, it would in a little time be almost universally rejected.

And now, having given a direct answer to this question, I cannot forbear making one remark on it; which is this, That there is a strange tincture of self-conceit and spiritual pride runs thro' the whole of it; for it is evident that the author, whoever he is, confines all the valuable qualifications in the question to himself and his own party, by insinuating, that no man so qualified can deny his doctrine. Which exactly tallies with that conceited boast, *Stand off, for I am more holy than thou*; from whence this way of talking seems to be copied.

*Quest.* 2. "Whether God doth not know himself better than we? Whether we may not safely, and must not firmly believe what he proposes to us of himself, as the object of our faith, however incomprehensible? Whether any objections against revealed truths can excuse us from believing them, when we can shew them to be revealed? especially, if the objections never reach the true case."

*Ans.* To the two first of these questions I answer in the affirmative; to the last in the negative. But then, I observe that it is intolerable trifling, or something worse, to put such questions to us.

*Quest.* 3. "Whether it is not impious presumption to pretend to answer *Zophar's* question, *Job* xi. 7. and too much boldness to presume to tell us what can, or cannot be predicated of the Deity; or, as we think, whether it is not blasphemy, confidently to deny with several aggravations what is true of any of the divine persons, or what God says of himself, merely because a dark, limited, depraved mind can have no imagination in a case where imagination has nothing to do?"

*Ans.* I allow that it is most impious presumption in any one to pretend to answer *Zophar's* question. Finite minds, I grant, cannot comprehend that which is infinite. But what then? Doth it at all follow, that, because we cannot know God perfectly, we do not know any thing of him? Certainly you will not say so; for if this should be true, then are you equally involved

volved in this terrible charge with us, since you pretend to tell, with great positiveness, what can be predicated of the Deity. In short, if this question is any thing to the purpose it is wickedly design'd to suggest, that we are guilty of arrogance and blasphemy, by confidently denying what is true of some of the divine persons; that is, as you explain it, what God says of himself; merely because dark, limited, depraved Minds can have no imagination in a case where imagination has nothing to do: A charge most abominably false, since we detest any thing of that kind as much as you. But I need say nothing more as to this matter; because I make no doubt but that all sober men, even on your side of the question, will look upon this as a most unrighteous slander.

Thus I have consider'd all that you offer in answer to this query, which stands good, notwithstanding any thing you have said against it: And, I think, I may also add, proved the impossibility of your Scheme, till you can steer between *Scylla* and *Charybdis*; that is, explain the word *person*, so as to keep clear of both *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. I now go on to the second query.

*Query 2.* “ Whether the Son doth not, in  
 “ his whole person, transact all as sent by God  
 “ the Father, and as referring all to his glory?  
 “ Can the supreme God act to the glory of another,  
 “ other, and be mediator to another?”

Your talk here, is altogether as unintelligible as your faith; and after the most careful perusal,

I can make no more of one, than t'other. For what you mean by equal in nature, second in order, Father, Son, and the like, as all applied to the same being, is what I shall never be able to guess, without the help of a new theological dictionary; which, as you seem to be well versed in those matters, you would do well to oblige the world with. But, having premised this general account, let us now examine your answer to this query more particularly.

“ The Son, you say, in his whole person, is  
 “ mediator, was sent by God the Father; re-  
 “ ferred all to the glory of the Deity, or of  
 “ the Father sustaining the majesty of the whole.  
 “ — And, afterwards, the supreme God did  
 “ not act, cannot act to the glory of another  
 “ God — but one divine person who is [the  
 “ supreme] God, acted for the glory of another  
 “ person [who is also the supreme God] sus-  
 “ taining, in the œconomy of redemption, the  
 “ rights of all the three persons in the deity,  
 “ and that is as well.” As well! this is some-  
 what unlucky; for if I should ask you what you  
 mean by it, I dare say, you either cannot or  
 will not tell. But, as I take this to be a slip,  
 owing wholly to inadvertency, I scorn to insult;  
 for I cannot think that you would wilfully say,  
 especially just after you had affirm'd the contrary,  
 that it is fit or congruous that the supreme God  
 should act to the glory of another God; which  
 yet this phrase plainly implies. But to go on in  
 order.

When



When I first read over the passages above transcribed, which is all that you say in answer to this query, I could not help thinking, that it is very unhappy for you that affirming and proving are not the same thing; for certainly, if they were, you would be one of the shrewdest disputants that has been known: but, as they are not, I defy any man upon earth to find any thing to the purpose in this answer. For the design of this, and all the other queries, was not only to call upon you to tell us your creed, but also (which was indeed the thing principally aimed at) to prove it: we never once doubted but that every body of your principles would say, that the Son in his whole person is mediator, &c. but then the difficulty with us, was to make sense of those propositions as they stand in your Scheme. For if the son is the same being with the Father, we cannot conceive how he can be supposed to mediate to him, or, more properly, to intercede with him, because that manifestly carries in it the absurdity of making the same being mediate to it self. Neither will your three distinctions at all mend the matter; for, if they are but distinctions, and not really different beings, it will be impossible, as we think, to shew that any mere distinction can alone be a sufficient foundation for offices and characters of these kinds. Tho, after all, if a distinction alone were sufficient to support such offices and characters, we imagine that you would be equally puzzled to prove that there could be any need of it at all: Because, notwithstanding these distinctions,

distinctions, if the being remains still one and the same, when it is so favourably disposed to the offender as to mediate, or intercede for his pardon ; it must, at the same time, be as much disposed to grant him a pardon, as it can be to intercede for it : which denies the necessity of any mediation at all. And what is here said of mediation, may be as well applied to satisfaction ; since, upon your principles, it is still the same being that satisfies, and is satisfied. But instead of touching upon any of these difficulties, and endeavouring to clear your scheme from its embarrassments, as we expected, you content yourself with giving us a confession of your faith, that being the more easy task of the two.

But tho you have not offered any thing in confirmation of the doctrine here advanced, yet you endeavour to explain it a little more particularly in the passage above recited, which will therefore deserve now to be considered. Your words are these : “ The supreme God does not  
 “ act to the glory of another God—but one  
 “ divine person, to the glory of another person, &c.” as before. But neither will this explication do your cause any service ; for by divine persons, you mean either real, or figurative persons. If the first, since you have before told us, that by this word you understand an intelligent agent, this is coming over to us, and saying as we do, that one being acts in the name, and refers all to the glory of another being ; for it has been already proved, that every agent is a being. But if the last, the figurative sense,  
 is

is what you intend, and would signify by a divine person ; then are the personalities of the blessed three destroyed, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are nothing more than three distinctions, or different modes of the same being : and what consistency or propriety there may be in saying, that one distinction or mode of existence, refers all that it doth to the glory of another distinction or mode of existence, I leave you to consider. But, not to insist any longer on this matter, the words now before us seem to me to give up the point in debate to the querist. For, tho you say that the supreme God cannot act to the glory of another God ; yet, if he can, and doth act to the glory of another *thing*, the case is entirely the same. Now, since you always pretend to use the word *person*, not as a mere sound only, but to signify something really existing and distinct in the Deity, it is evident that you make the supreme God act to the glory of that thing, whatever it is, which is so distinguished, when you tell us that one person, who is the supreme God, acts to the glory of another person. And this is all that was meant by, or at least enough to justify that clause of the query, which the words last recited are designed as an answer to.

But before we leave this head, it is worth observing that you allow, “ That the Son refers “ all to the glory of the —Father, as sustaining the majesty of the whole Deity.” This I take to be a very unlucky concession for you. For if the Son refers all to the glory of the Father, let



let his nature and essence be what it will, it can be no harm for us to do so too. And if the person of the Father in the œconomy of redemption sustain'd the majesty of the whole Deity, certainly we do well in ascribing this honour to him alone in the œconomy of worship, by terminating all our worship ultimately in him, exclusive of the Son; who cannot in the present state of things, and as related to us, have any right to such supreme worship, since he sustains an inferior character, and acts in an inferior office. For supposing he had by nature a right to such supreme or terminative worship, yet, since you own that he has voluntarily condescended to stand in another relation to us, I think it evidently follows, that thereby he has voluntarily receded from that right. Tho, after all, I must own that I understand not what you mean by a *necessary being's* voluntarily condescending to become something different from what it is by *necessity*. And thus, Sir, I am apt to fancy that I have proved that we are right in practice, however mistaken in theory, when with St. Paul we confess that *Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father*. Let us now proceed to your questions.

*Quest. I.* “ Whether it is not injurious trifling to suppose us to say that the supreme God  
 “ acts to the glory of another God, or is mediator to another God, when we believe that  
 “ the divine persons are one God, and that there  
 “ is not another God, but one only ?”

*Ans.*



*Ans.* This query was not design'd to represent you as saying any such thing, neither doth it in any sort do so, as was shewn above. So that the injurious trifling which you charge upon it, is nothing but a wild imagination of your own. All that was intended by it was to point out a difficulty which the querist apprehended would rise upon your principles, which therefore he desired you would explain so as to keep clear of ; and as you have not done it, I shall take the liberty to leave it with you still as a *desideratum*. For as, on the one hand, we can have no notion how one person, who is the supreme God, can refer all to the glory of another person who is also the supreme God, unless they are two Gods ; so on the other, if they are both the same God, we are afraid that this casts the vilest reflection on the blessed *Jesus*, by making him quibble and equivocate, when he says *I seek not my own glory* ; which, as low and mean as you say we make him, is an imputation that we abhor the very thought of.

*Quest. 2.* “ Whether a supreme God doth not  
 “ infer one or more inferiour Gods ? Whether  
 “ a supreme and an inferiour God do not make  
 “ two Gods, for surely one and one make two ?  
 “ If then the Father be the supreme God, and  
 “ the Son a God, a true God, are there not  
 “ two divided true Gods, one supreme and another inferiour ? What blasphemous contradictions are here staring us in the face ? Is not this heathenish language a bringing in the pagan multiplicity of Gods and idolatry

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“ into

“ into the christian religion ? Doth not scrip-  
 “ ture, reason, and the whole church of Christ  
 “ abhor this ?

*Ans<sup>w</sup>.* To this I reply, that the God and Father of our Lord *Jesus Christ* is the only true God, but yet that the Son, who is the brightness of his glory, and express image of his substance, who has all power given him in heaven and in earth, and a throne and dominion ascribed to him, who was in the beginning with God, and who also was God, may upon these accounts be truly said to be God, I very freely own. But what then ? doth it from thence follow that there are two necessarily existing beings, as the only true God most certainly is ? not at all as I can see. But to shew the silliness of this way of talking, I need only invert the question thus. If the Father is the supreme God, and the Son is the supreme God, and the Holy Ghost is the supreme God, does not this make three Gods ? for surely one, and one, and one make three. If then the Father and the Son are really distinct agents, each possess'd of all possible perfections, let their union be as close as you please, are they not for all any such union two true Gods ? what blasphemous contradictions are here staring us in the face ? but I must end with an *Ec*. for I am weary of such trifling. Let us therefore go on to the next Query.

*Query* 3. “ When you worship the whole  
 “ Trinity, who is your mediator to the one  
 “ God ? have you at that time any other but  
 “ the

“ the man *Christ Jesus* ? and does not the me-  
 “ diation of *Christ* depend upon the virtue and  
 “ acceptableness of his sacrifice, who is the me-  
 “ diator ? and is it not upon that account that  
 “ he is able to recommend us to God ? when  
 “ therefore you worship the one God, Father,  
 “ Son, and Holy Ghost, thro’ whom do you  
 “ worship, and by whose influence do you go  
 “ to God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ?

Here you tell us, that you see no inconve-  
 nience in saying, that the man *Christ Jesus* is the  
*one* Mediator to the *one* God. I am sorry that  
 you who are so eagle-ey’d to spy out other peo-  
 ples faults, should be so short-sighted as to your  
 own. By this one may see that orthodoxy can  
 excuse any thing. For if any of us had but said  
 half so much, we should have been presently  
 cry’d out against, and blasphemy and every thing  
 that is bad would have been charged upon us.  
 But why you should not see any inconvenience  
 in this, is what I cannot, for my life, imagine ;  
 since it must be evident to every body, who  
 knows any thing of these matters, that this is  
 a very material part, and principal article of the  
 heresy taught by *Faustus Socinus*, which (if I  
 don’t mistake my man) you have very often and  
 vehemently condemned, ay, and anathematized  
 too in the pulpit. I do not know, indeed, but  
 you may think that you have left your self a  
 sufficient hole to escape at, by explaining that  
 ambiguous phrase, the *man Christ Jesus*, so as  
 to signify the whole person of *Christ*, *i. e.* the  
 God-man ; but I believe this will hardly do, be-



cause it is plain from the form of speech which you use, that you allow the objection its full force ; which entirely cuts off all hopes of relief that way. But I see I might have spared my self the trouble of fixing your meanings, for I find you take care, a little lower, to inform us, that you are not guilty of so much modesty as to be ashamed to speak out : accordingly you proceed very courageously thus ;

The divine nature, which is the *same* in each person of the Trinity, is the proper formal object of divine worship ; wherefore no one divine person can be worshipped exclusive of the other two. This it must be own'd is a very great discovery. For if the divine nature is the same in each divine person, *i. e.* if all the three persons have but one common divine nature, why then to be sure no one of these persons can be worshipped exclusive of the other two, because whenever the divine nature is worshipped, the divine nature is worshipped. But this may be set in a juster light thus : If the divine nature is the same in each of the three *somewhats*, which you call persons, then these *somewhats* are not really and properly distinct persons at all, because it is absolutely inconceivable that any thing should be a distinct person that has not a distinct nature belonging to it ; but the divine nature is the same in [*i. e.* is common to] each of these *somewhats*, therefore these *somewhats* are not really and properly three distinct persons, but one person only, even as the nature on which the personality depends is but one nature only.

And



And consequently, whatever these somewhats are else, seeing they are really and properly but one person, whenever this one person is worshipped, these somewhats are not, cannot be excluded. I have been the more particular here, because I apprehend, that to assert that the three persons have but one common divine nature, destroys the real personalities of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and leaves us a Trinity of names only. If you think I am mistaken, only be so kind as to prove that any thing may be a distinct person that has not a distinct nature, and I will give up the cause. But after all, whether this discourse of the divine nature's being the same in three does or does not destroy the personalities, this is so far from answering the question, by shewing that you have any other mediator than the man *Christ Jesus*, that it seems to yield this matter up to the *Socinians*, as was said before: Unless, to get out of one difficulty you will run your self into another, by saying, *that the nature, to whom you pay worship, is the same individual nature with that thro' whom you pay it* ; which, we imagine, amounts to a denial that there is any mediator at all.

But I perceive that you are not satisfied your self with the account you have given of this matter, because a little further on you tell us, that " Sometimes you worship *God*, the *deity*,  
 " abstracting from the consideration of the per-  
 " sonal distinctions, and without the personal  
 " names, and then Christ is your mediator, not  
 " simply as God, but as God-man." This is, I  
 con-

confess, a more direct answer to the question than any thing we have met with before ; but then it seems to me to be attended with some *inconveniences*. For, either this is a retraction of what you said in the beginning of your answer to this query, or else it plainly implies that you have two mediators, and worship *sometimes* thro' one, and *sometimes* thro' the other. If the first, it is indeed but a small matter, because it is no news for people to say and then unsay, affirm and then deny, when they are talking of things so very unintelligible as the orthodox, or commonly received hypothesis is ; (see Mr. *Watts's* account of it in his fifth Dissert. p. 158.) But if the other, I must leave you to reconcile your doctrine with St. *Paul's*, who, I think, teacheth us that there is but one mediator betwixt God and man, the *man Christ Jesus*, for it is past my skill to do it. But it is very remarkable, that you say in the passage now under consideration, that sometimes you worship *God the deity*. These words seem to me to imply something extremely like a fourth person in the godhead, or, at least, that there are four somewhats to whom you offer praises and adorations. For either the three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are only three mere names, or else they are something more than mere names. If they are but mere names representing the deity under different considerations, then the consequence is, that (tho the deity is the same deity under all and each of these considerations) when he is worshipped under one consideration only,

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the worship is different from that when he is worshipped under another, or under all the considerations together. But this is not what you understand by this term, for you have all along sufficiently declared against *Sabellianism*, and so you must mean something more than mere names. Now when you worship one of these distinct somethings distinctly, and all of them jointly, that which you worship distinctly, and that which you worship jointly, are different things, unless all is each, and each is all; which is to deny that there is any distinction\*.

And now, before I come to the questions, I think it necessary to go back a little, and take some notice of a reflection you make on the querist for using the word mediator in an improper sense: your words are as follows; “ If any  
 “ weighty difficulty is intended in the question,  
 “ it doth not arise from any difficulty in the  
 “ thing, but from the quaint, artificial way of  
 “ proposing it, or from the odd notion you seem  
 “ to have of a mediator, *that he is one thro’*  
 “ *whom we worship another, and no more.*”  
 If a man were disposed to be merry, you have given him a special opportunity by your *quaint*

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\* I know some men affect to make use of the terms *God the Trinity*, and *the Triune God*. I wish they would read and consider Mr. *Calvin's* judgment and reasons against this manner of invocation. *Admonit. ad Polon.* Possibly either his arguments or his authority might make them less fond of these unscriptural forms of expression. From what he there says I think he never could have approved or countenanced the use of this other phrase, *God the Deity*.



way of talking here. For why, dear fir, should this notion of a mediator be so very *odd*, when it is certainly one part of the scripture-notion of a mediator? since Christ is always there represented as the *medium* by which we are to go to God. And the other part of Christ's mediatorial office is more properly express'd by the term intercession than mediation. But the main thing is, that the querist's odd notion of a mediator is one thro' whom we worship another, and *no more*. This, I confess, would be an odd notion indeed; as odd a notion as it is in you to fancy that the querist says any such thing. For if you, or any man else, can find any thing like it in the query; nay if intercession is not clearly express'd in it as well as mediation, then I must confess, that I do not understand the meaning of the words. This accusation therefore is altogether false and groundless, and only tends to discover a violent appetite to quarrelling, as it shews that you can take the liberty to make faults where you can find none, and will rather invent blunders, and throw them on your adversaries, than want matter for wrangling.

I have carefully look'd over the remaining part of your answer to this query, and meet with nothing in it but one or two of your usual flights in praise of your own principles and party, and contempt of ours; which, as they make nothing in point of proof, I shall take no farther notice of. And so I go on to answer your necessary questions.

*Quest* 1.



*Quest. 1.* “ What do you mean by worship-  
“ ping God by another ?”

*Ans.* When I say that I worship God by or thro’ another, I mean, that when I offer up prayer or praise to him, I do it by or thro’ *Jesus Christ*, as the appointed mean of conveyance.

*Quest. 2.* “ Upon what doth the virtue and  
“ acceptableness of the sacrifice of the *Man*  
“ *Christ Jesus* depend ? or in other words,  
“ Whence has his sacrifice that virtue and ac-  
“ ceptableness ?”

*Ans.* The virtue and acceptableness of Christ’s sacrifice depends on, and proceeds from, 1st. The excellency of his person : And, 2d. The appointment of God.

*Quest. 3.* “ Whether these words, *the man*  
“ *Christ Jesus*, were spoken by the apostle to  
“ lessen him ; or shew how he came to be fitted  
“ for his office ; and to draw out our faith in,  
“ and love to him ?”

*Ans.* These words, *the man Christ Jesus*, were certainly not spoken by the apostle to lessen him ; but as you say, to shew how he came to be fitted for his office, &c. Nor do I know any body who ever so much as imagined otherwise.

*Quest. 4.* “ Whether our Lord could have  
“ been a mediator by office, if he had not also  
“ been a mediator by nature ? how could he  
“ have laid his hands on the parties at variance  
“ had he not been a partaker of the nature of  
“ both ? had any inferior, finite being inter-  
“ posed,

“ posed, the wrath of God had burnt him up  
 “ like briars or thorns, *Isa.* xxvii. 5. What  
 “ kind of a mediator would a man be between  
 “ an angel sent to execute judgment, and a-  
 “ nother man the offender? What a poor me-  
 “ diator would a sheep be between a roaring  
 “ lion and a lamb? could the sheep expect  
 “ any other but to be devoured first? Pardon  
 “ the simile, the distance here is infinitely  
 “ greater. I desire you would consider this  
 “ matter seriously, and think what you can  
 “ look for from such a mediation or such a me-  
 “ diator. And, when you answer this, re-  
 “ member that the Lord Christ is such a me-  
 “ diator as to be a sacrifice; a propitiation;  
 “ a peace-maker by being a peace-offering;  
 “ a ransom for our redemption; a surety for  
 “ God to us, and for us to God; a proper  
 “ Saviour from sin, Satan, death and hell:  
 “ a curse for us, that we might be redeemed  
 “ from it; sin for us, that we might be made  
 “ the righteousness of God in him; a head  
 “ that died that we might live; a conquerour,  
 “ a king, &c. And that when *Jehovah* saved  
 “ his people, it was by *Jehovah* their God,  
 “ *Hos.* i. 7. Nor could any other have been  
 “ a prophet, priest, and king of his Church.”

*Ans.* The only thing material in this long  
 question is the first clause of it, which is,  
 “ Whether our Lord Christ could have been  
 “ a mediator by office, if he had not been also  
 “ a mediator by nature?” Now if I should say  
 in answer to this, that the appointment of God  
 was

was alone sufficient to constitute him a mediator ; I cannot see that it would be attended with any greater difficultys than arise from your own account of this matter ; which supposes him to be the same individual being that he mediates to. But as this is what we have no need to say, I desire you to take notice that I do not say it. My answer then to this question is, that I grant all that it requires, since upon our principles Christ is more properly a mediator by nature, than on your's ; because he is neither of a party with the offender, nor offended. See above.

*Quest. 5.* “ What do you mean by those words, *By whose influence do you go to God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ?* As you propose them they are silly and trifling. But let me ask you, from your concessions, Whether any person without infinite perfections could influence, or assist all the people of God in all times, places, and circumstances, in their worship and other dutys ? Whether this alone is not a sufficient proof of his deity ?”

When I first read over this question, I purposed to give up the words you speak of as trifling ; for as they stand here they do not seem indeed very material. But afterwards, considering that it is not fair to condemn a man without hearing, especially when his accuser is an adversary ; I thought proper first to refer to the query, and see what that said : And there I soon found (to my satisfaction I confess) that they appeared in

a quite different light. I shall repeat them in the order they stand in, and then explain them ; which is answering the question. “ When there-  
 “ fore you worship the one God, Father, Son,  
 “ and Holy Ghost, thro’ whom do you worship,  
 “ and by whose influence do you go to the  
 “ One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ? ”  
 Which is as much as if he had said ; since the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the same being, you must be supposed to worship the same being, *thro’* the same being, *and by the influence* of the same being : Or thus ; since you say that they are all the same being, do you not worship the person of the Son, thro’ his own person ; and the person of the Holy Ghost by the influence of his own person ? that is, have you any other mediator with the One God than the mere man *Christ Jesus* ; and any sanctifying spirit distinct from God, whose spirit he is ?

The last part of the question is, *mutatis mutandis*, nothing but a repetition of what has been replied to in my answer to your 8th preliminary question, to which I refer you.

*Query* 4th. “ If according to Quest. 2d. the  
 “ Son, in the business of redemption, transacts  
 “ all to the glory of the Father ; and in the  
 “ present state the Father sustains the person of  
 “ the supreme God ; how doth this consist  
 “ with your paying supreme or ultimate worship  
 “ to the Son ? doth not this make the Son to  
 “ act for his own Glory as much as the Father  
 “ himself ; since an equal in nature being self-  
 “ existent, and acts according to his own na-  
 “ tural



“ tural dignity, must do his own will, and seek  
 “ his own glory, and cannot refer his actions to  
 “ another; but acts according to the counsel  
 “ of his own will, and for his own will and  
 “ pleasure?”

In answer to this query, you begin with acknowledging, that “ the Son, as mediator,  
 “ transacts all in the business of redemption, to  
 “ the glory of the Deity; or of the Father sustaining the rights and majesty of it.” But yet, you are of opinion, that this may very well consist with your paying supreme or ultimate worship to the Son, seeing you know of no religious worship but *one*——and the Father and Son are the *same*: which to be sure wants nothing but truth to make it a good argument. For, if on the one hand, the Father and Son are the same; that is to say, if the Father is the Son, and the Son the Father; no body could be so mad as to doubt but that the worship must be one and the same: so on the other, if the worship is but one and the same, it is equally evident that the Father and Son are also one and the same; that is, as was said before, the Father is the Son, and the Son is the Father. And this, how absurd soever, seems to be your real sentiment as to this matter. For, besides that in the passage now under consideration, you inaccurately predicate sameness of the persons, even as personally distinguished; it also unavoidably follows from your own words, when you tell us, that you “ ascribe——the *very*  
 “ *same* worship—to the Son as to the Father;  
 “ upon

“ upon the *very same* formal ground or reason,  
 “ the divine nature.” Now that by the same formal ground or reason, you mean that each person has the same divine nature is plain, not only from your own confession, “ That the divine nature is the same in each person ;” but also from the nature of the thing, and the necessity there is that you should mean so : For if the nature were not the same, that is, if each person had not the same divine nature, neither would there be the same formal ground or reason for the same worship as paid to each person. But if each Person has the same divine nature, since the divine nature is one self-existent, unoriginated nature ; it follows, at least, that each person is self-existent and unoriginated, since each person has the whole of that nature, as the foundation and ground of his personality ; which is self-existent and unoriginated. And, if each of the divine persons is self-existent and unoriginated, then neither of the divine persons is derived, or doth proceed from another ; because to derive, or proceed from another, is to be originated and not self-existent : but to be originated and not self-existent, is not to be unoriginated and self-existent (unless originated and unoriginated, not self-existent and self-existent are the same things :) therefore every unoriginated, self-existent person, neither doth, nor can derive or proceed from another. The direct consequence of which is, That the terms Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but mere sounds ; and that there is no real Father, Son, and

and Holy Ghost at all. From whence I conclude, that these terms are used in an improper, and figurative sense only ; that they are but mere *Prosopopæia's* ; that the Father and Son are indeed but one person ; or in other words, that the Father is the Son, and the Son the Father ; which was the thing to be proved.

But as the most plausible objections against our principles are drawn from the argument about worship, which I must do you the justice to own I think you have made the most of ; I shall endeavour to consider this matter with the greatest exactness I can, and be more particular than ordinary in my reply to this part of your performance, as it really deserves. And here, to prevent confusion, 'tis necessary, before we proceed to enquire into the nature of worship, that we define the term.

By worship then I understand, *some peculiar respect or honour paid to an intelligent being, not merely on the account of his natural excellency, but principally, because he stands in such a relation to the worshipper.* Let us therefore now see, whether this notion of worship will not admit of the distinction of supreme and subordinate as we contend.

In order to set this matter in a clear light, it is necessary that we first of all fix the ground and reason of worship ; which is not, I think, as you always take for granted, the divine nature *alone* ; but the relation of the being worshipped to the worshipper. For tho' mere excellency may be a sufficient ground for love and esteem,  
which



which is, indeed essential to worship ; yet, since it is not the whole of worship, it is evident that the obligation to worship must arise from something else ; because worship, besides love and esteem, always carries in it an acknowledgment of relation and dependance ; which I prove thus : When I say it is my duty to worship king *George*, I thereby acknowledge, that I *ought to pay him* some peculiar honours. But king *George's* right to these honours, implied in the words *ought to pay*, is not founded on the simple consideration that he is *a king*, but on the relative consideration that he is *my king*. For if the simple consideration of kingship, was alone the foundation of a right to these honours ; then it is plain that every other person who is also a king, would also have the same right ; which is absurd. Accordingly, therefore, when I *do* worship king *George*, it is always understood as signifying a relation to him, and dependance on him as my king and governour ; and consequently, as excluding every other person from any such right ; which could not be if kingship alone were the ground of it : because kingship is common to others with him. From whence I think it evident, that relation and dependance are the formal ground and reason of worship ; which was what I undertook to shew.

Having thus stated and fixed the ground and reason of worship, let us now go on to enquire, Whether it will not admit of some distinction ? And here, I believe, every body must grant, that if relation and dependance are the founda-

tion



tion of worship, the degree of relation and dependance must always limit and determine the degree of worship ; or, in other words, that the person worshipped must be always worshipped in proportion to his eminence, and relation to the worshipper. The consequence of which is, that if there are persons more or less eminent, more closely or distantly related to us, there must be a proportionable difference in the worship due to them ; which, I suppose, needs not to be proved ; since it is the only reason that can be assigned why we should not honour a peasant as much as a peer, and a king equally with God. Thus far then we have sure footing. Nothing therefore now remains but to shew that this particular distinction of *supreme* and *subordinate* worship is just, and founded in the nature of things ; and all will be plain.

And here, I believe, I am prevented by my reader, the thing is so very easy. I shall chuse to prove this by an instance or two ; that being the clearest method that can be taken in such a case : And, besides, facts are such stubborn things that they cannot be disputed. The instances I would pitch on are those of an ambassador, and a vice-roy. The ambassador and vice-roy are persons advanced to very high offices, by having the names of their principals in them, and being deputed to act for them. All that is done to them terminates ultimately in their master, and the honour or dishonour of their actions falls upon him. If their persons are affronted, the injury is always deemed his : If they are esteemed and worthily treated, 'tis

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construed respect and reverence to him. These things will, I suppose, be freely granted me. But then, it may be, some will say, if all the honour done them terminates ultimately in their master, how are they honoured themselves at all ? I answer, very much, tho not equally with their master. For when an ambassador has the character given him of having executed his office wisely, tho the primary honour falls upon his principal as executing such an office by such a person ; yet there is also a real honour remains to the ambassador, *viz.* that of fidelity and wisdom. The same may be said in like manner of a vice-roy. When the subjects address thanks to him for his prudent administration of justice, tho the first and greatest honour redounds to his master, who administers justice by him ; yet he is also honoured himself too, tho not with the same degree of honour his master is. And this, I think, evidently proves, that there is such a thing as *supreme* and *subordinate* honour or worship.

What has been here said of worship in general, may be as well applyed to *religious* worship as to *human* : that being nothing else but some peculiar respect and honour, paid to a *divine, intelligent Being*, upon the account of his excellency, and the relation he stands in to the worshipper. And so I leave this matter with you ; and go on to shew that Christ may be worshipped, upon supposition that he is inferior to the Father, without any breach of the first commandment.

To make this appear, it will be necessary, in the first place, to enquire a little into the import  
and

and obligation of the first commandment. And here, I very freely confess, that this commandment, *Thou shalt have no other gods before me* ; seems to me to have been designed, not to preclude any person that God should think fit to honour with his name, and dignify with his presence, from that worship and homage which is due to so advanc'd an office ; but only to prohibit the setting up any *false, anti-god*, in opposition to him, the true God. To confirm this opinion, I shall only offer two arguments. The first is drawn from the nature of the thing ; which doth not at all require the denial of such honour to a person so qualified : because the giving such honour is so far from being a robbing the principal of his glory, and an alienation of his right, that on the contrary, it strengthens and confirms it ; since all the honour done his minister is constructively his, it being nothing else but an acknowledgment of his authority in the person of the minister, as was said above. Accordingly, we find what is here advanc'd, to be true in fact, *viz.* in the case of the angel which God appointed to preside over the children of *Israel* ; which is the other thing I would offer in proof of this opinion. Now concerning this angel, God himself is represented as giving a charge to the *Israelites*, injoyning them to honour him for the very reason just now mentioned, *viz.* because *his name was in him*, *Exod. xxiii. 21.* The words run thus : *Beware of him [the angel] and obey his voice, provoke him not ; for he will not pardon your trans-*



*gressions; for my name is in him.* Which is as much as if it were said, “ Consider the high character *he* bears as my representative; my name and authority is in *him*; and therefore be sure that you honour and reverence *him* as you would me my self: For if you should provoke him by an act of disobedience, he will certainly resent it as an injury to me, and be very zealous for my honour, and careful to vindicate it; for my name is in him; he is my minister, he will not pardon your iniquities.” I know very well that you will plead that this angel was no other than the supreme God himself. But, not to insist on the absurdity of making God his own angel; I think that this is sufficiently answered by those texts that tell us, that *no man has seen God at any time, nor heard his voice, &c.* Which necessarily proves that this angel must be some other being, and not the supreme God. And here, by the way, I desire that it may be taken notice of, that the whole context we have been considering, is extremely majestick, and runs in such a style as God must be supposed on such an occasion to speak in, if he were to speak at all: yet since it appears by the text last quoted that he never doth speak, this is a home instance to prove, that the person representing makes use of the very same language, and behaves in the very same manner as the person represented would do in such a case. But to return: As a farther proof that the first commandment doth not exclude, even creatures from some degree of worship, when dignified in



a peculiar manner with the presence of God ; I might argue from the *cloud* ; which was certainly worshipped by the children of *Israel*, on the account of the inhabitation of God in it\*. But this may suffice.

And now, having proved, as I think, that the first commandment doth admit of inferior and subordinate worship in any case where God shall so appoint ; it only remains to shew, that in the present case he hath done so. This is a matter of fact depending entirely on revelation ; and therefore cannot be decided any other way. And here, as all long before, for the sake of brevity, I shall content my self with offering only a few proofs.

The first I would propose to you is that remarkable one in *Dan. vii. 13, 14. I saw in the night visions ; and beheld one like the Son of Man came with the Clouds of heaven ; and came to the antient of days, and they brought him near before him : And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom ; that all people, nations and languages should serve him, &c.* That this illustrious prophecy relates to our Lord Christ, is evident from the sameness of the phrase, by which the person who is the subject of this prophecy, and our Saviour in the 1st of the *Revelations*, and many other places is characterized.

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\* " That such an inhabitation of God in a creature, by which that creature was not only called God, but that adoration was also due to it on that account, was a notion that could not have scandalized the *Jews*." See *Burnet's Expos.* 39 Art. p. 49.

All this is, I suppose, past doubt, and so needs not to be insisted on. Well, it is said of *him* that he had a kingdom *given* him. Now the word *given* implies, that he had no natural right to this kingdom ; because a gift being matter of mere bounty, is absolutely inconsistent with any such right. And this dominion, &c. is said to have been given him, *that* all people, nations and languages should serve him : which not only founds the worship to be paid him on the positive institution and appointment of God ; but also shews that his dominion over all people and nations, was the ground or reason of it.

The next passage I offer, is that memorable one where Christ tells us, that *all power is given him in heaven and earth*, Mat. xxviii. 18. Which being the same form of speech with the former, requires no farther discussion here. Another place very much to the point, is that in *John* v. 22, 23. *For the Father — hath committed all judgment to the Son, that all men might honour the Son even as they honour the Father, &c.* and again, v. 27. — *and hath given him authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of Man ; i. e. the Messiah\**. The next passage I would take

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\* That this phrase, the *Son of Man*, as spoken of, and applyed to, Christ, signifies the same thing that *Messiah* does, is evident from a great many places where one is used for the other : particularly that just now quoted, *Dan.* vii. 13. Where the very same person is called *the Son of Man* ; which in the 9th chapter is called *Messiah the Prince*. And it must be also remembered, that this Son of Man was to be served by all people, &c. But surely you will not say that the human nature of Christ was to be served, because that is certainly, upon your principles, *creature-worship*.

notice of, is in *Heb. i. 6.* *When he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith, and let all the angels of God worship him.* And again, *ver. 8, 9.* *But unto the Son he saith — O God — God even thy God hath anointed thee.* Now that this first-begotten, whom the angels are commanded to worship, and this God who was thus anointed by his God, was really the divine *Logos*, is evident from those words in the second *verse*; where the apostle tells us, that the person he is speaking of was he *by whom God made the worlds*; which cannot possibly be applyed to the human nature of Christ, unless in a *Socinian* sense. From whence, I think, it follows, that the divine *Logos*, even as concerned in the creation of all things, was worshipped only in consequence of the command and appointment of God. For if he had naturally a right to be worshipped by the angels, there could have been no need of any positive institution about it: but since God did command it, 'tis certain that such an institution was necessary; and therefore his right to such worship arises solely from the grant and appointment of God; which is what we are contending for. Another very remarkable text is what the apostle says in *1 Cor. xv, 24—28.* *Then cometh the end, when he (the Son) shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; — and — also himself be subject to him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.* These words, I apprehend, prove two things. 1. That the subjection of all things to the Son, is owing to the Father's having



ving put all under him. And, 2. That the Son, when in his highest capacity, after the cessation of the mediatorial kingdom, is to be subject to the Father ; to whom he is to deliver it up, that God (that person to be sure to whom this surrender is made) may be all in all. But I should transcribe a great part of the new testament to take in every thing of this kind : wherefore I shall add but one place more, which not only fixes the dominion of Christ upon the appointment of God the Father ; but also expressly determinest the worship paid him to be a subordinate worship. It is that in *Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11. Wherefore God has highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name : that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow ; and every tongue should confess, that he is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.*

And now from what has been said, I think I may very fairly conclude, that tho our Lord Christ, who in the present state of things at least, acts ministerially, since he refers all to the glory of the Father, has a worship due to him on the account of the dominion *given* him, (*i. e* of the high office he executes as God's representative) yet that this worship is not ultimate and terminative ; and therefore not supreme as his God and Father's is. Thus I believe I have sufficiently confuted what you boldly assert, when you say, that " this kind of worship is every  
 " where condemned in scripture ; that it is in  
 " reality subversive of natural religion, and of  
 " all religion, a lye, in the nature of the thing,  
 " and

“ and what involves man in the *greatest danger*  
 “ *for eternity.*” Let us now see if we cannot  
 answer your questions.

*Quest. 1.* “ Whether you do not worship the  
 “ Son, believe, trust in, and pray to him, &c.  
 “ according to numerous scripture passages and  
 “ examples ? If you do not, your friend  
 “ *Socinus* will not allow you to be called  
 “ christians : If you do, I ask further,”

*Ans. w.* We do worship the Son, &c. accord-  
 ing to all the precepts and examples which  
 we find in the Bible relating to this matter.

*Quest. 2.* “ Whether you worship him as  
 “ God supreme, or not ? If as God supreme,  
 “ who is your mediator ? your own question :  
 “ If not I ask,”

*Ans. w.* We do not worship him as God su-  
 preme, because we think that he himself de-  
 clares that he is not so, when he says that his  
 Father is *greater than he*, and the *only true God* ;  
 and because we cannot find any scripture precept  
 enjoining, or example countenancing such  
 worship.

*Quest. 3.* “ If you worship one who is not  
 “ God supreme, do you not expressly and di-  
 “ rectly transgress the first commandment ; and  
 “ the light and law of nature ? Upon this sup-  
 “ position, I ask, Do you worship one whose  
 “ essence, substance, or nature, is made or un-  
 “ made ; or in other words, created or un-  
 “ created : (by creating I mean making out of  
 “ nothing) If uncreated, seeing there is but

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“ one ;

“ one, *viz.* the nature of God ; you worship  
 “ God supreme.” If not I ask,

*Ans.* To the first of these questions I answer, That we worship *Jesus* the mediator of the new covenant, who was in the beginning with God, and who also was God ; but as we do not terminate our worship in him, but, with *St. Paul*, confess him Lord to the glory of God the Father, we apprehend that this is no breach of the first commandment. To the second my reply is, That we believe this person whom we thus worship, to be the only-begotten Son of God ; *i. e.* to have been generated by, or derived from the Father. But as to his metaphysical essence, substance or nature, as you love to speak, since the scripture is altogether silent about it, we desire to be so too.

*Quest. 4.* “ Is not one whose nature is created  
 “ a creature ? if he is, what is the foundation  
 “ and ground of your worshipping him ? what  
 “ do you ascribe to him ? Can a creature be  
 “ every where present, omniscient, all-sufficient,  
 “ almighty, which our prayers suppose  
 “ the object of worship to be, or we mock him ?  
 “ But whatever worship it is that you pay to  
 “ him, it either terminates in him, or not : If it  
 “ doth it is ultimate ; if it doth not, but passes  
 “ thro’ him to the Father, then it is supreme.  
 “ You may chuse which you please, but while  
 “ the world lasts it will be a dead weight upon,  
 “ and an invincible prejudice against, *Arianism*,  
 “ *Socinianism*, and the *New Scheme* too.”

*Ans.*



*Ans<sup>w</sup>.* This is a very unfair question, since it supposes us to say what we never do say ; and therefore I might be excused if I passed it over. Besides, if I should grant that Christ is a creature, it would make nothing in point of proof either way. But because you frequently insinuate that this is the consequence of our principles ; I shall take some little notice of it. To this question then, “ Is not one whose nature is created a “ creature ? ” I answer yes. But what then ? how doth this affect us, since we never pretend that Christ’s nature was created, but always make use of the same scriptural word as you do in this case, and call it begotten ; which if, in your apprehension, it signifys the same thing with created, makes this charge recoil with double force upon you ; because, upon this supposition, you must wilfully and designedly predicate createdness of Christ as often as you say he was *begotten*. The remaining part of this question has been sufficiently answered already : Only there is one passage which I profess I do not understand. It is that where you say, “ If our “ worship terminates in Christ, it is ultimate ; “ but if not, but passes thro’ him to the Father, “ then it is supreme.” This I must own, is beyond my latin ; and therefore I must desire you to explain it : for till I know what you mean by it, I cannot pretend to say any thing to it. Your next words are also equally mystical, and will therefore want some further explication ; for without your help I shall never be able to guess what that is, which, *while the world lasts,*

*will be a dead weight upon, and an invincible prejudice against Arianism, Socinianism, and the New Scheme too.*

*Quest 5.* “ Does the scripture say any thing  
 “ of any religious, divine worship but one?  
 “ Hath it taught us any thing of ultimate  
 “ and relative, supreme and inferior worship?  
 “ or how are we to adjust those things in our  
 “ minds? The saints are said to *call upon the*  
 “ *name of the Lord Jesus*, 1 Cor. i. 2. and  
 “ *to believe in him*, John xiv. 1. *to trust in*  
 “ *him*, Psal. ii. 12. Is this a relative invo-  
 “ cation? or are we to believe in him with  
 “ an inferior, middle kind of faith? Did not  
 “ *Stephen's* dying worship terminate on Christ?  
 “ was it not such a worship as is paid to God  
 “ supreme? Compare *Acts* vii. 59. with *Luke*  
 “ xxiii. 46.”

*Answe.* I have shewn above that there is, and must be, such a distinction as we are pleading for; to which I refer you as an answer to this question.

*Quest. 6.* “ Is there command or example in  
 “ scripture propounded for our worshipping ano-  
 “ ther God, an inferior God, a made God, as  
 “ you make Christ to be? Doth not the light  
 “ of nature and the law of God condemn this?  
 “ Think not to say with your friend the *Sober*  
 “ *Appellant*, that *the first commandment is so*  
 “ *far repealed*; and that the Father hath com-  
 “ manded us to worship Christ, *a God, another*  
 “ *God, another true God, &c.* For, to pass  
 “ by several unanswerable confutations of this  
 “ desperate

“ desperate answer ; I reply in one word, this  
 “ impious fancy can never be entertained by  
 “ any sober, thinking person, till you can  
 “ prove *that God can deny himself, and has*  
 “ *done it.*”

*Ans.* This question hath also been sufficiently answered in the foregoing part of the defence of this query. I shall therefore take no notice of any thing here, but your charge upon the *Sober Appellant* ; which, being most abominably false, I call upon you now to retract. I shall transcribe the whole passage which you had in your eye, and let the reader judge between us.  
 “ And if it be included (as our author says it is)  
 “ *in the first commandment*, that we should  
 “ *have no other object of worship* ; we say, that  
 “ command is so far repealed, even as the fourth  
 “ command in the decalogue is, so far as it  
 “ concerns the *seventh day*, which the *Jews*  
 “ were required to keep as their sabbath.  
 “ *Sober Appeal*, p. 125.” Now it is evident, that here is nothing like what you accuse this writer with, unless you can shew that he doth allow that all worship is appropriated and confined to God only ; which, that he doth not, is plain from all his arguments about it. I shall only add that it was base and mean in you to represent this ingenious gentleman as saying that absolutely, which you could not but know was only provisional or hypotherical.

*Query 5th.* “ Whether the scriptures of the  
 “ old and new Testament, do not plainly shew,  
 “ that as there is but one God, so that one  
 “ God



“ God is but one, *I or Me*, exclusive of all o-  
 “ thers ; as it would be easy to prove by many  
 “ scriptures, were it not for enlarging too much ?  
 “ [See only *Psal. lxxxiii. 13. Thou whose*  
 “ *name alone is Jehovah. Isa. xlv. 21. There is*  
 “ *no God else besides me.* That He, our blessed  
 “ Saviour says, is his Father, *John viii. 54. It*  
 “ *is my Father that honoureth me, of whom ye*  
 “ *say that he is your God.* And again our blef-  
 “ fed Saviour affirmed his Father to be the *only*  
 “ *true God.*] Now is not the only true God  
 “ the one God ; and is not the Father of Christ  
 “ the Father only ? Now as the same scriptures  
 “ which say there is but one God, do call o-  
 “ thers God, who are not that one God ; and  
 “ in particular the Son of God is called God  
 “ upon the account of all power committed to  
 “ him ; or upon the account of the excellency  
 “ of his being, and the lively resemblances he  
 “ bears to God the Father ; and upon the ac-  
 “ count of his sustaining the place of God, as  
 “ being the word of God ; and so God with  
 “ God, as being he by whom God made all  
 “ things, *Ephes. iii. 9. Heb. i. 2, 3.* This has  
 “ no inconsistency in it that I can perceive :  
 “ and it is plain by several hundred scriptures,  
 “ that the Father is distinguished as God, from  
 “ the Son and Spirit, as well as by the term  
 “ Father ; and your proofs do not conclude,  
 “ because they prove three Gods, as you manage  
 “ them, in my apprehension. If you say that  
 “ this was a voluntary condescension only in  
 “ our blessed Saviour, let it be so ; (altho I be-  
 lieve

" lieve you cannot prove it to proceed only  
 " from thence) yet why do you then in fact,  
 " pay the worship to the Son and Spirit, which  
 " this present state of acting does not allow ?  
 " either the Father does in the present state  
 " act only as supreme or not: If not, then the  
 " actings of the Son and Spirit, are not to  
 " the glory of the Father, but to their own ;  
 " or else the same person may act as supreme  
 " and subordinate, which I understand not.  
 " If you do, I shall be glad of your reason. I  
 " do not understand how the person *to* whom  
 " I go in worship, should be the person *thro'*  
 " whom, and *by* whom I go. If you under-  
 " stand this, (for God's sake) explain it to me ;  
 " or else honestly confess you worship you  
 " know not how."

In your answer to this query, which perhaps  
 might have been better divided into two or three,  
 you punctually follow the same method you had  
 taken all along before ; positiveness and evasion  
 being the easiest way of confuting an adversary.  
 Of this kind is the very first passage with which  
 you begin your reply to this question. It runs  
 thus: " The scripture shews and we firmly believe,  
 " that there is but one God ; and that this one  
 " God is but one God, one *Jehovah*, exclusive  
 " of all other Gods and *Jehovahs* ; and yet the  
 " same scriptures ascribe both these names, and  
 " titles to more than one, whom we call  
 " persons ; whence we do not conclude that  
 " there is one God, and another God, but that  
 " these two are one." And then, to prove this  
 paradox,

paradox, you cite *John* x. 30. which is a certain sign that you are in great distress; because that text, as explained by the same evangelist in another place, (and certainly he knew best what he meant by it) must be understood to signify something very different, at least, from unity of essence, substance or nature; which is what you would infer from it. The place I allude to, is that in *John* xvii. 21, 22. where Christ prays for his disciples, *that they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us.* — *And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them: that they may be one even as we are one.* Which must determine the oneness in the text you quote, not to be a oneness of nature, substance, &c. because, if it were, then Christ must be supposed to pray that they should be made the one God; which is so absolute an impossibility, and such a complete contradiction to common sense, that I am confident no man who is not literally out of his wits will say it. But, after all, it is remarkable, that tho you affirm over and over, that the same titles are in scripture ascribed to three persons, yet you never once offer to prove it; but perpetually take for granted that it is so, when yet you cannot but know that this is a material thing in the dispute betwixt us. Since, therefore, this is your principal fastness, and chief place of retreat, 'tis to be hoped, that for the future, you will take care to fortify it more strongly, and support it better with arguments; because at present the foundation doth

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not seem to be equal to the superstructure. I must add, that if you could possibly prove this assertion, *unity of person*, might be as fairly concluded from it as *unity of essence*; and so your doctrine might be irresistibly attack'd from that quarter.

But you go on and tell us, that the "glorious" text in *Isaiah* xlv. 21. is spoken by and of the "Son"; nor can it be applied to any other, "which the apostle confirms, *Rom.* xiv. 10, 14. "1 *Cor.* i. 30. and 2 *Cor.* v. 21." I have been at some pains in considering the text, and comparing it with those referred to; but cannot see for my life, what reason you had for this assertion. For since these words were confessedly spoken by that person who was the God of *Israel*, and since our Saviour declares that that person is his Father; I think it unavoidably follows, that they neither are, nor can be applied to the Son, even upon supposition that there were such distinct personalities in the deity as you plead for. I would therefore desire you, before you give your-self such airs again, to prove what you thus boldly affirm: Which, if you should do, I will undertake to shew, that either the Father is excluded amongst the false gods; or else, that the Son is the Father; *the exclusive terms infallibly proving that there is but one person who is the supreme God, which clearly confirms our doctrine, and overturns yours, to talk in your own way.*

I pass by your next paragraph, it being nothing else but an invidious reflection on the querist; (a thing so common in your letter, that it is not

worth minding) and go on to that where you misrepresent him by insinuating, That he understands that Christ is God in the same low, and improper sense that men and devils are. Now that this is only one of your artful turns, is evident : For tho all authority comes originally from God, yet since there is a mighty difference between the authority one person is invested with, and that which another exercises, it follows, that that person who has the greatest degree of authority, and whose government most resembles God's, is in a much higher and more proper sense God, than one who is less like God, by being invested with less authority : even as a *vice-roy* may be much more properly said to be a king, than the *mayor* of a particular borough ; and a *lord chancellor* than a petty constable. If therefore this is true in the present case, much more is it so in the other, where the difference is almost infinitely greater. But this way of writing is so little to the purpose, that it ought rather to be despised than answered ; wherefore I shall take no farther notice of it.

But you go on and tell us, in the next page, that there is not any hint in the scripture of the Son's being called God, *on the account of his having all power committed him, nor because of the excellency of his being ; nor yet for the lively resemblances he bears to God the Father ; no, nor as personating and sustaining the place of God* : all which negations are far from being true, if what has been advanced in the foregoing parts of this discourse holds good ; which as I believe it will, I shall trust the whole of this  
matter

matter upon that issue. And so I leave you to prove (which surely can be no hard task, since you clearly perceive it) that “ *there is shameful trifling, gross impiety, and abominable blasphemy in this way of talking.* ”—But it is no strange or surprizing thing, for some people to fancy inconsistencies, trifling, impietys, and even abominable blasphemy, where indeed there is no such thing, to turn your own artillery upon your-self.

The next thing you take notice of are those words in the query, “ It is plain by several hundred scriptures, that the Father, as God, is distinguished from the Son and Spirit, as well as by the term *Father* ; which you say doth not at all prove that the Son is not God.” To which I answer, that you are so far very right, for we never pretend that it doth ; all that we would infer from it being only this, That since the Father, as God, is distinguished from the Son, therefore the Godhead of the Son is somewhat different from that of the Father ; because if it were the same in both, neither could, as God, be distinguished from the other ; which we think is shewn by these texts, to be false in fact.

A little lower you seem to be angry because we apprehend, that “ your proofs do not conclude, since as you manage them, we fancy, if they prove any thing, they prove three Gods.” I profess, I do not desire to disoblige you, but, as opinion and faith are obstinate things, I hope you will excuse me, if I say I cannot help being of the same mind ; and give



me leave to add, shall always continue so, unless you, or somebody else for you, shall shew that we are mistaken : which we imagine will be a work of some difficulty. For if three distinct agents, each possessed of all possible perfections, are not three distinct Gods, neither is one such agent one God. But in answer to this, you recriminate by charging *Ditheism* on us. Your words are these : “ You forget that your own, “ and your friend’s arguments, infallibly prove “ two Gods.” I observe here, that forgetfulness is a very epidemical distemper, and seems to be your misfortune as well as the querist’s; since otherwise, it is impossible to find an excuse for your intolerable self-contradiction. For, as on the one hand, if we make Christ to be a creature, *a mere creature, as much as you or I*, or the meanest worm, you contend that he cannot be God ; so on the other, if we prove him to be so a God as to make two, *proper, true Gods*, he cannot be a creature. Both which propositions can’t be true upon your own principles, because contradictory one to the other. Since therefore you have asserted these things, I am willing, charitably, to suppose this blunder is owing to the badness of your memory, because else it must proceed from something worse. But this indeed is not much to the point, as you your-self must be understood to own in the next line ; where you profess to be just coming to it. Let us now see if you succeed any better in what follows.

You begin with an appeal to us, “ You know “ that the word God is often used in the bible

“ —essen-

“ ——— essentially, as including in it all that “ is meant by that name.” This is a very ambiguous expression, and may be either affirmed or denied without any breach of truth. For if by this extraordinary period you mean only that the word God is often used to signify all that it signifys, we grant it; but if you would say by this way of speaking, that the one God is three persons, which I suppose is what you designed by these words; why then we deny it, and challenge you to prove it if you can.

But, I think, I never saw any thing more perfectly trifling than what follows soon after. The whole passage is remarkable, and therefore I shall be at the pains of transcribing it literally. “ But let me ask you, as one that loves your “ soul, and would willingly bring you from what “ we think a very dangerous error; Do you “ think the form of baptism proves three Gods?” Which is just as much to the purpose, as if I should ask you, with the same solemn gravity, whether you believe a thing which I am sure you never believed in your life. And such a question would not be more needless, (not to say foolish) than this of yours; because you know very well that we are professedly pleading that the three persons are not three Gods. But you go on: “ It is plain there are three persons mentioned.” What then? “ why then it is plain “ we are baptized into the name, not names, of “ all three.” This, I must confess, is a very learned remark, and discovers a surprising skill in criticism. But to be serious: I cannot think this observation just, because not at all founded on any

any rule of grammar, when yet it is designed as a grammatical remark. For in our syntax it is the same thing to say, I baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy-Ghost, as to say, I baptize in the names of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. However, let this word *name* signify what it will, it seems it clearly proves your point; for thus you proceed: "Now whether this word name points out their unity of essence, or by it be signified the authority of all the three; or whether being baptized into the name, signifys our being baptized into the faith, love, worship and obedience of the three; this glorious text proves our point, &c. that is, unity, or sameness of essence and nature." But because you seem to lay so great a stress on this text, I shall give you Mr. *Baxter's* comment on this, and the foregoing *verse*: "After these, (and other appearings to them) *Jesus* said, as I have died to redeem the world, in order to the ends of my undertaking, the Father has *given* me an universal propriety, and governing power, as chief administrator under him in heaven and earth. — By which authority I now commission you to go abroad into the world, and make — all nations my disciples, &c." And then after in his 6th note, he says, "that to be baptized in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is no less than by solemn covenant to give up one's-self to God the Father, as our Father reconciled by Christ, our chief owner and ruler, and our chief benefactor, even as our God; and to Christ as our Saviour;

" and



“ and the Holy Ghost as our sanctifier.” Thus far Mr. *Baxter*, who was never thought a favourer of our cause. This exposition of the words I take to be a very good one; and as much as can be fairly inferred from them: wherefore I shall leave you to prove, that unity of essence is implied in them, as you suppose.

But a few lines lower you say, “ Can, or  
 “ doth any think, that a creature, and the crea-  
 “ ture of a creature; or, at least, two infinitely in-  
 “ ferious persons or beings, would have been  
 “ joyned in the same solemn institution with the  
 “ great God? To this I answer, that you need  
 not make so strange; for, if one may take their  
 words, every body of your side of the question  
 must mean something very like it, when they tell  
 us, that they worship the whole person of Christ.  
 For, since the human nature of Christ is one part  
 of the whole person of Christ, whenever the  
 whole person of Christ is worshipped, the  
 human nature also is worshipped, because the  
 whole is always equal to its parts. But since  
 you propose this question with a triumphant sort  
 of air, I shall endeavour to shew briefly, that,  
 upon any scheme whatsoever, it is impossible to  
 avoid thinking that a creature is joyned in this  
 most solemn institution with the great God. For,  
 besides the reason just now mentioned, it is evi-  
 dent from the context, that the Son into whose  
 name all nations were to be baptized, is the very  
 same person that speaks in the foregoing verse,  
 and says *all power is given me*. Now, since it is  
 certain that the supreme God cannot owe his pow-  
 er to the gift or concession of any other person or  
 thing,

thing, I dare say you will not pretend that this is to be understood of Christ as God, in the high sense you believe him to be so; because that would be to deny that he is God, by denying that he wants some perfection essential to God. In order, therefore, to make Christ a capable subject for such a gift, you must of necessity take in the human nature, which every body grants, was a creature; and upon this consideration it may be truly said a creature is joyned in this solemn institution with the great God\*. Which is all that I mean when I say it is impossible for any body to avoid thinking so.

Your next paragraph is nothing but an account of your method of worship; which, as it makes nothing in point of argument, needs not be particularly considered. Accordingly, I shall take no notice of any thing here, but that passage where you say, *That in your doxologies you endeavour to ascribe equal honour, glory, praise and blessing to all the three.* And with relation to this, since you acknowledge that you ascribe honour, glory, praise and blessing to the Holy Ghost, permit me to ask you, what precept you have commanding, or example countenancing any such worship? This, at least, I am sure of, that there is no one instance of any doxology to the Holy Ghost in all the new testament.

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\* There is no possibility of evading this consequence upon Mr. Cummin's principles, because he supposes that the term Son, belongs only to the human nature of Christ, by denying that the divine *Logos*, is a Son in any sense of that word.

And

And now I find nothing more remarkable, but what has been already considered, till I come to your questions ; excepting only your last lines, which have such a peculiar air of insulting, that I should chuse to pass them wholly by, (to return your own compliment) were it not more out of regard to you than the querist. Your words are these : “ Piety is ever accompanied with humility and fear : whereas intolerable pride and self-conceit is inseparable from ignorance and error.” This is indeed an excellent remark ; but I wonder how you could write it without self-reflection. I go on now to the questions.

*Quest. 1.* “ When it is said there is no God besides *me*, and the like ; whether all other gods, inferior as well as equal, are not for ever excluded ?”

*Ans.* These words certainly exclude *all whom they are designed to exclude*, viz. *all foreign, strange, false, inferior, made gods*, set up in opposition to the speaker, the only true God ; but do not at all deny that our Lord Christ, whom he has appointed chief administrator under him, may on that account be called God ; because all such ascriptions to his representative, are no more than acknowledgments of his own authority, as has been shewn more fully above.

*Quest. 2.* “ Is Christ called God in an improper and figurative sense only ? If he is, is he a God at all, or at least any more than angels, prophets, magistrates, &c. And how doth this consist with the titles, attributes, works, and worship proper to the one God ?”



*Ans.* Christ is not called God in an improper and figurative sense only, because God, his God, has highly exalted him, and given him a name that is above every name, by putting all things under him; which cannot be said of angels, &c. For unto which of the angels said he at any time, sit thou at my right hand? And this consists very well with the titles, attributes, works, and worship due to the one God.

“ *Quest. 3.* “ Whether we can know that  
 “ the Father is the one true God, any otherwise  
 “ than by the marks and characters which the  
 “ scriptures ascribe to him? Whether these are  
 “ any others than the names, titles, attributes,  
 “ works, and worship of the one true God?  
 “ Whether these are not ascribed to more per-  
 “ sons than one? and seeing there is but one  
 “ true God, whether they are not all equally  
 “ the one true God?”

*Ans.* We know that the Father is the one true God by the marks and characters which the scriptures ascribe to him, and no otherwise: but we deny that these marks and characters are there ascribed to more than one; from whence we conclude, that there is but one person who is the only true God.

“ *Quest. 4.* “ Whether the same artificial me-  
 “ thods that are used to explain away the proper  
 “ deity of the Son, will not weaken all the  
 “ proofs of the true, proper deity of the Fa-  
 “ ther?”

*Ans.* I know of no artificial methods that have been used to explain away the proper Deity of the Son, nor any thing like it, and so can only

only guess at your meaning. In answer therefore to this question, if by the methods you speak of you would signify the arguments we make use of to prove that *Jesus Christ is not the only true God, the God and Father of all, who is above all*; I say, that these methods can never weaken all, nor any of the proofs of the true, proper deity of the Father. If you mean any thing else by the artificial methods above-mentioned, as at present I profess that I do not know what it is; I can only promise you an answer when you shall be so kind as to inform me.

*Quest. 5* “ Whether you worship the Son at all? If you do not, are you not transgressors of many commands, both of the old and new Testament, and unworthy the name of *Christians*, who are characteriz’d by this, that they call upon the name of the Lord *Jesus*? If you do, since he is the person to whom, is he not also the person thro’ whom you worship? or who is the person thro’ whom? Or do you worship him without any person thro’ whom?—More might be proposed, but seeing they would irritate, which I have no inclination to do, I forbear.”

*Ans.* As I have told you before several times, I now tell you again, that we *do* worship the Son, and so are not transgressors of any commands in either of the Testaments, nor yet unworthy to be called by the name of *Christians*, since we are of those that do call upon the name of the Lord *Jesus*: To whom we have access with boldness, (for he is not one

who cannot be touched with a feeling of our infirmities) and offer up our prayers and praises immediately, there being no mediator appointed betwixt him and us that we know of. Which is an answer that you cannot give to this question, because your principles suppose him to be that very same supreme God, to whom we are commanded to make known our requests by a mediator : The direct consequence of which is, that the supreme God mediates to himself, which is absurd ; or else, that the mere man Christ *Jesus*, is your mediator to the one God, which is down-right *Socinianism*. *You may chuse which of the two you please ; but, as long as the World lasts, this will be a dead weight upon, and an invincible prejudice against, that which you glory in calling the Orthodox Scheme.*

But you conclude this question with these words, “ More might be propos’d, but seeing “ they would irritate, which I have no design “ to do, I forbear.” In answer to this I observe, that if you had such a stock of questions by you, it was a great pity that you had not left this out, in this place, because all of it that had not been asked again and again before, is the most egregious trifling that I ever saw. However I am glad that you forbear them, because you would not irritate ; and that after having laid about you in so furious a manner, you have at last spent your rage, and are in some degree come to your-self. For I can only say that if you are in so good a humour now as you pretend, you are quite another man than you appear in almost every other part of this performance. But, as this finishes my  
answer



answer to the last question, I imagine that I have now done with Mr. *Bunny's* friend. I shall therefore conclude with a few words to Mr. *Bunny* himself, who comes in here very opportunely to bid us farewell.

Thus, Sir, I have replied at large to your friend's answer ; and I think, I may add sufficiently defended our faith against all his objections. For we imagine that all such arguments as have been hitherto produc'd, are too weak and superficial to overthrow a doctrine that is built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief-corner stone. Being therefore verily persuaded of the truth of these things, and that this faith which we profess, is the very same that was once deliver'd to the saints, we endeavour as well as we can to defend it, and stand witnessing this day, both to small and great, that the *God and Father of all, who is above all, is the only true God* ; believing also *all things that are written concerning Christ*, who is the wisdom of God, and the power of God to as many as receive him. And tho it is evident that we are very much calumniated on this account, (*for as concerning this Sect, we know that it is every where spoken against*) yet we desire that the same mind may be in us which was in Christ Jesus, who when he was reviled, reviled not again, but render'd blessings for curses ; and prayed for his very persecutors, saying, *Father forgive them, for they know not what they do.*

And here, having mentioned this matter, I think I have great reason to complain of your  
af-

assistant's way of writing ; which abounds with hard words, reproaches, and uncharitableness ; but doth not seem so much designed to inform as to amuse, to convince as to terrify, and to give a true state of the question as to puzzle and perplex it. Of this kind is his frequent, unrighteous use of the word *Arian*; his insinuations that we reject revealed truths, knowing them to be revealed, merely because we cannot conceive the manner in which they are ; his confining sincerity and integrity to himself and his own party ; his innuendo's concerning gross impiety, presumptuous arrogance, and abominable blasphemy ; his down-right charging our principles as damnable ; his skulking under the subterfuge of ambiguous terms ; his shuffles, quibbles, and evasions about person, essence, being, and the like ; his dogmatism, in affirming things which he never so much as attempts to prove ; his insisting mostly on matters which the law is more concern'd with than the question : And, in one word, (for I am weary of descending to particulars) his sly intimation that we are furious enemies of Christianity.

Seeing therefore your friend is so very blameable in those respects ; as I have reason to believe, *whether you have any thing solid to answer or no*, that he will be for saying something, I only desire these few fair things of him. That he would allow it possible that he may be mistaken, and, accordingly, forbear to dignify his own arguments, and those of his party, with the title of infallible ; That he would lay aside ambiguous expressions, and define his  
 terms

terms before he uses them : particularly, that he would tell us the precise meaning of *person* and *being*, as he understands them in his creed : That since he contends that something, not a being, may be a person, he would let us know what it is ; Or, in other words, that he would prove that there is a *medium* between *something* and *nothing*, a *being* and *no being* ; which, if his evidence bears any proportion to his positiveness, he may easily do : That he would carefully abstain from all sly insinuations, injurious reflections, slanderous imputations, and uncharitable censures ; for as a good cause doth not need such helps, so they can never do a bad one any service : That he would not let his confidence out-run his arguments, but always support his affirmations with proofs : And, lastly, That he would not only say, but prove, that *un-originated, self-existent* nature, may be *communicated*. Let him observe these few reasonable things ; and I promise him his reply shall be speedily considered ; and our cause either given up or further defended, as his performance shall deserve.

And now I cannot forbear observing, with relation to your conduct, that it is a very wrong method to set up scare-crows, and bugbears to frighten people from enquiring ; which is a thing that you was certainly guilty of in the querist's case, and (if you are not much wronged) upon many other occasions. For tho' such management may influence some silly, weak minds, yet it never will, nor ever can do your cause any real service.



vice. And besides, in the present case, one would hope that you would avoid it, because it is at any time in our power to retort the same charge upon you ; for instance : When you charge my principles with blasphemy, as denying Christ to be the supreme God ; I may, on another account, with as much reason, retort upon yours, that they make God the author of sin. So again, when you say that if we are mistaken, we shall find it a terrible thing to have robbed Christ of his essential glory ; we may reply, and if you are, you will find it equally terrible to have ascribed the titles and worship due to the only true God, to one not the only true, and to have given that glory to another, which belongs to him alone. Many more examples of the like nature might be enumerated, but I forbear.

To conclude : If your friend should think any thing I have said too severe, I only desire him to lay his hand upon his heart, and then say whether or no his provocations do not excuse me. But, I believe, I need not make any apology of this kind, because almost every expression that looks angry or passionate, is but his own artillery turned upon him. I have nothing more to add, but to desire you and him to weigh what is here offered impartially, *as in the presence of God : and if it is not sufficient to convert, yet it may learn you to speak with more modesty of the faith and church of Christ* : Who always held, that the Father is God in some peculiar sense ; which, I desire you would take notice, is all I am pleading for. *I am your's, &c.*

F I N I S.